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RUTH BADER GINSBURG’S COPYRIGHT
JURISPRUDENCE
Ryan Vacca* & Ann Bartow**
When Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg died on September 18, 2020, the world
lost a trailblazer for gender equality, a pop culture icon, a feisty liberal luminary
who fought on behalf of the disenfranchised in the areas of civil rights and social
justice, and an inspiration to millions of people. She will long be remembered for
the social changes she helped effectuate as an advocate, scholar, and jurist.
Her amazing civil rights legacy overshadows other areas where Justice
Ginsburg’s contributions have been substantial. This Article discusses one of the
most interesting: copyright law. During her time as a jurist on the Supreme Court
and D.C. Circuit, she authored sixteen opinions in copyright cases and joined her
colleagues’ opinions in eleven others. But unlike her gender equality and social
justice opinions, in which she predictably sided with rock-slinging Davids, Justice
Ginsburg tended to favor Goliath content owners in copyright cases. This Article
offers possible explanations for why this was so, by holistically evaluating Justice
Ginsburg’s copyright writings. It identifies several themes running through her
copyright opinions—incrementalism, intergovernmental deference, a preference
for alternative mechanisms for relief, and stoicism—and juxtaposes her copyright
jurisprudence with her approaches to gender equality and reproductive rights.
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INTRODUCTION
On September 18, 2020, the world lost an irreplaceable leader. Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg did not simply serve as the 107th Justice on the U.S. Supreme
Court. She was a pioneer in the fight for gender equality both before and during
her time on the bench.1 She was an inspiration to millions of women, girls,
See generally THE WAY WOMEN ARE: TRANSFORMATIVE OPINIONS AND DISSENTS OF
JUSTICE RUTH BADER GINSBURG (Cathy Cambron ed., 2020). See also Rebecca L. Barnhart
& Deborah Zalesne, Twin Pillars of Judicial Philosophy: The Impact of the Ginsburg Collegiality and Gender Discrimination Principles on Her Separate Opinions Involving Gender
Discrimination, 7 N.Y.C. L. REV. 275, 309, 312–13 (2004); Martha Chamallas, Ledbetter,
Gender Equity and Institutional Context, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1037, 1037 (2009); Shira Galinsky, Note, Returning the Language of Fairness to Equal Protection: Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg’s Affirmative Action Jurisprudence in Grutter and Gratz and Beyond, 7 N.Y.C. L.
REV. 357, 361 (2004); Linda Greenhouse, Introduction: Learning to Listen to Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, 7 N.Y.C. L. REV. 213, 217 (2004); Sidney Harring & Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Scrupulous in Applying the Law: Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Capital Punishment, 7 N.Y.C.
L. REV. 241, 243 (2004); Jill Elaine Hasday, The Principle and Practice of Women’s “Full
Citizenship”: A Case Study of Sex-Segregated Public Education, 101 MICH. L. REV. 755
(2002); Catharine A. MacKinnon, A Love Letter to Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 31 WOMEN’S RTS.
L. REP. 177, 183 (2010); Serena Mayeri, “When the Trouble Started”: The Story of Frontiero
v. Richardson, in WOMEN AND THE LAW STORIES 57, 90 (Elizabeth M. Schneider & Stephanie M. Wildman eds., 2011); Serena Mayeri, Reconstructing the Race-Sex Analogy, 49 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1789 (2008); Serena Mayeri, The Strange Career of Jane Crow: Sex Segregation and the Transformation of Anti-Discrimination Discourse, 18 YALE J.L. &
HUMANS. 187, 229 (2006); M. Isabel Medina, Real Differences and Stereotypes—Two Visions of Gender, Citizenship, and International Law, 7 N.Y.C. L. REV. 315, 316 (2004); Reva B. Siegel, The Pregnant Citizen, from Suffrage to the Present, 108 GEO. L.J. 167, 182
1
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men, boys, and those falling outside the traditional gender boundaries.2 And
during her later years, through her fiery dissents, she became known as The
Notorious RBG, an unlikely but widely beloved pop culture icon.3 The astonishing outpouring of grief immediately after her death reflected the enormity of
her contributions to the nation.4
Undoubtedly, Justice Ginsburg will be primarily revered for her work on
women’s rights and equality. As a lawyer and law professor, she advocated for
(2020) [hereinafter Siegel, Pregnant Citizen]; Reva B. Siegel, Equality and Choice: Sex
Equality Perspectives on Reproductive Rights in the Work of Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 25
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 63, 63 (2013); Reva B. Siegel & Neil S. Siegel, Struck by Stereotype: Ruth Bader Ginsburg on Pregnancy Discrimination as Sex Discrimination, 59 DUKE
L.J. 771, 798 (2010); Sarah E. Valentine, Ruth Bader Ginsburg: An Annotated Bibliography,
7 N.Y.C. L. REV. 391 (2004); Serena Mayeri, Ruth Bader Ginsburg Made the Impossible
Look Easy, PHILA. INQUIRER (Sept. 19, 2020), https://www.inquirer.com/opinion/comment
ary/ruth-bader-ginsburg-death-legacy-replacement-supreme-court-20200919.html [https://pe
rma.cc/SZ2F-39CK]; Mark Joseph Stern, Ruth Bader Ginsburg Changed the World, SLATE
(Sept. 18, 2020, 8:47 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2020/09/ruth-bader-ginsburgchanged-the-world.html [https://perma.cc/6AWW-M4PU]; Melanie O’Brien, The RBG Legacy: Equality and Inspiration, OPINIOJURIS (Sept. 23, 2020), http://opiniojuris.org/2020/09/
23/the-rbg-legacy-equality-and-inspiration [https://perma.cc/BE5D-ELXZ]; Michelle Travis,
Justice Ginsburg’s Insights on Male Allyship, Fatherhood, and Dads of Daughters,
FATHERING TOGETHER (Sept. 24, 2020), https://www.fatheringtogether.org/justice-ginsburgsinsights-on-male-allyship-fatherhood-and-dads-of-daughters [https://perma.cc/BL2F-Y77L].
2 Jay Cannon, RBG Is Still Inspiring Young Girls to Be a ‘Superhero,’ Dream Big. These
Photos Prove It., USA TODAY (Sept. 24, 2020, 12:57 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/
news/nation/2020/09/24/ruth-bader-ginsburg-hero-these-girls-wearing-super-costumes/35
15835001 [https://perma.cc/4WYV-Y7PB]; Grace Hauck, ‘A Leader of All Humanity’: Ruth
Bader Ginsburg Was a Hero, Icon, Fighter for Women and Girls Across the Nation, USA
TODAY (Sept. 20, 2020, 2:23 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2020/09/20/
ruth-bader-ginsburg-women-girls-legacy/5839221002 [perma.cc/MGA9-QNWG]; Jocelyn
Noveck, Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s Impact on Women Spanned Age Groups, Backgrounds,
DENVER POST (Sept. 20, 2020, 2:09 PM), https://www.denverpost.com/2020/09/20/
ruth-bader-ginsberg-life-death-impact-women-supreme-court [perma.cc/9BUM-XZC9].
3 See Samantha Cooney, How Ruth Bader Ginsburg Became an Unlikely Pop Culture Icon,
TIME (Nov. 12, 2018, 5:59 PM), https://time.com/5386238/ruth-bader-ginsburg-pop-cultureicon [https://perma.cc/A2JR-PH9T]; Patrick Ryan, ‘RBG’: How Ruth Bader Ginsburg Became a Legit Pop-Culture Icon, USA TODAY (Dec. 22, 2018, 4:28 PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/life/movies/2018/05/01/rbg-documentary-shows-how-ruthbader-ginsburg-became-pop-icon/562930002 [https://perma.cc/S5SF-352R]. Two films
about her life were released in 2018. See RBG (Participant Media 2018); ON THE BASIS OF
SEX (Focus Features 2018).
4 Jenny Gathright & Christian Zapata, Hundreds Gather to Honor and Grieve Ruth Bader
Ginsburg Outside Supreme Court, WAMU (Sept. 21, 2020), https://wamu.org/story/20/09/
21/hundreds-gather-outside-supreme-court-to-honor-ruth-bader-ginsburg [perma.cc/5DHB-3
QSA]; Rachel Jones, See How Americans Are Mourning Ruth Bader Ginsburg in the Nation’s Capital, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Sept. 21, 2020), https://www.nationalgeographic.com/
history/2020/09/americans-mourn-ruth-bader-ginsburg-celebrate-legacy [perma.cc/724U-X
MSS]; Dominique Mosbergen & Lee Moran, Outpouring of Grief as Nation Mourns ‘Hero’
and ‘Titan’ Ruth Bader Ginsburg, HUFFPOST (Sept. 19, 2020), https://www.huffpost.com/
entry/ruth-bader-ginsburg-dead-reactions-mourning_n_5f654884c5b6b9795b10875c
[https://perma.cc/NY7C-U8H7].
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these causes and shifted a nation’s way of thinking about gender.5 As a jurist,
she built on these foundations and helped effectuate important legal changes.6
She fought for the things she cared about, stating:
[I would like to be remembered as] someone who used whatever talent she had
to do her work to the very best of her ability, . . . [a]nd to help repair tears in her
society, to make things a little better through the use of whatever ability she has.
To do something, as my colleague David Souter would say, outside myself.
‘Cause I’ve gotten much more satisfaction for the things that I’ve done for
which I was not paid.7

Justice Ginsburg will be remembered as a feisty liberal luminary who
fought on behalf of the disenfranchised in areas of civil rights and social justice.8 She was an amazing inspiration.
But Justice Ginsburg also played a significant role in copyright law developments.9 During her time as a judge on the D.C. Circuit and as a Justice on the
Supreme Court, she authored sixteen opinions in copyright cases10 (ten majority, four concurrences, and two dissents) and joined the opinions of others in
See generally Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190
(1976); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Moritz v. Comm’r, 469 F.2d 466 (10th Cir.
1972). See also Michael J. Klarman, Social Reform Litigation and Its Challenges: An Essay
in Honor of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 32 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 251 (2009); Wendy W.
Williams, Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s Equal Protection Clause: 1970–80, 25 COLUM. J. GENDER
& L. 41 (2013).
6 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996). Compare Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire
& Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 643–61 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (calling for Congress
to change the law) with Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, PUB. L. NO. 111-2, 123 STAT. 5
(overruling the Supreme Court’s decision in Ledbetter).
7 Jamie Ducharme, How Cancer Shaped Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s Life and Work,
TIME (Sept. 18, 2020, 8:17 PM), https://time.com/5507530/ruth-bader-ginsburg-cancerhistory/ [https://perma.cc/B85D-5CFA] (alteration in original) (quoting The Rachel Maddow
Show: Exclusive Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg Interview (MSNBC television broadcast Feb.
17, 2015, 9:00 PM)).
8 See Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 559–94 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting);
Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 570 U.S. 297, 334–37 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting);
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 169–91 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 298–305 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
9 There are, of course, other areas where Justice Ginsburg made significant contributions,
including civil procedure. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014); BNSF Ry. Co.
v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549 (2017); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564
U.S. 915 (2011); Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006); Tobias Barrington Wolff,
Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Sensible Pragmatism in Federal Jurisdictional Policy, 70 OHIO
ST. L.J. 839, 840 (2009) (summarizing Justice Ginsburg’s contributions to civil procedure on
the Court and her love of the subject). This is no surprise given her research and teaching
interests early in her career as a law professor—Swedish civil procedure and civil procedure
courses. Transcript of Interview of U.S. Supreme Court Associate Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, April 10, 2009, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 805, 805–06, 819–20 (2009) [hereinafter Interview
Transcript].
10 Four opinions were authored while on the D.C. Circuit and twelve from when she was on
the Supreme Court.
5
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eleven cases (ten majority, five of which were unanimous, and one concurrence).11 Those who benefitted from or simply applaud Ginsburg’s progressive
approach toward social justice issues may be startled by some seeming incongruities within her copyright jurisprudence. Surprisingly, she did not predictably side with the underdog in copyright disputes.12 In fact, most of her written
opinions and many of her votes could be fairly categorized as promoting
“strong copyright,” and favoring Goliath over David.13
One of the many fascinating aspects of copyright law is that the competing
views sparking its doctrinal flashpoints do not settle easily into liberal versus
conservative terrain. Copyright protections have a different political valence.
Neither political party has fixed positions on copyright law, and jurists can be
unpredictable.14 For example, Justices Thurgood Marshall and William Brennan voted together very frequently. But one of the most important copyright
cases of all time,15 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,16 saw
Justices Marshall and Brennan on opposite sides. Justice Brennan voted with
the majority, endorsing the view that using a personal video tape recorder for
“at home” taping of television shows, so the shows could be watched at more
convenient times, was fair use rather than copyright infringement.17 The reasoning reflected a strong pro-freedom-of-speech orientation18 that Justice Brennan is deservedly famous for.19
Justice Marshall, however, co-signed a dissent asserting that even the home
taping of a copyrighted television program so it could be watched later was an

She joined four opinions while on the D.C. Circuit and seven while on the Supreme
Court.
12 See infra Part I.
13 But see infra Section I.C.
14 For a broader explication of this topic, see Ann Bartow, When Bias is Bipartisan: Teaching About the Democratic Process in an Intellectual Property Law Republic, 52 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 715 (2008).
15 Bruce E. Boyden, The Most Important Supreme Court Case in Copyright Law: Sony
Corp. v. Universal City Studios (1984), MARQ. UNIV. L. SCH. FAC. BLOG (Nov. 1, 2010),
https://law.marquette.edu/facultyblog/2010/11/the-most-important-supreme-court-case-incopyright-law-sony-corp-v-universal-city-studios-1984/ [https://perma.cc/R5NU-LTCE].
16 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
17 Id. at 456.
18 Id. at 425 (“The District Court concluded that noncommercial home use recording of material broadcast over the public airwaves was a fair use of copyrighted works and did not
constitute copyright infringement. It emphasized the fact that the material was broadcast free
to the public at large, the noncommercial character of the use, and the private character of
the activity conducted entirely within the home. Moreover, the court found that the purpose
of this use served the public interest in increasing access to television programming, an interest that ‘is consistent with the First Amendment policy of providing the fullest possible
access to information through the public airwaves.’ ” (quoting Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v.
Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 102 (1973))).
19 See generally Geoffrey R. Stone, Justice Brennan and the Freedom of Speech: A First
Amendment Odyssey, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1333 (1991).
11
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infringement.20 The dissenting opinion by Justice Blackmun that Justice Marshall joined also argued that Sony could be liable for inducing and materially
contributing to the infringement by manufacturing video cassette players with
recording capabilities.21 This reflected an “exclusive [property] rights” instinct
about broadcast television programs shared by many copyright maximalists.22
Yet no one seriously questioned Justice Marshall’s otherwise stellar liberal credentials simply because he joined the Sony dissent.
The breakdown of votes in Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org,23 Justice
Ginsburg’s final copyright opinion, was similarly unusual. The case required
the Court to decide whether copyright laws appropriately protected annotations
that described court decisions interpreting Georgia’s statutory laws, which were
incorporated into Georgia’s official code.24 Framed slightly differently, the
question presented was could Georgia use copyright law to limit the public’s
ability to access the annotations that Georgia chose to incorporate into its written code in an effort to provide meaning and context for the laws of the state
that bind its citizenry?
The majority opinion, authored by Chief Justice Roberts and joined by Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh, held that copyright protection did not extend to the annotations.25 The majority opinion engaged in economic class analysis and expressed concern for those denied access to the
annotations for financial reasons.26 Chief Justice Roberts, generally considered
part of the Court’s conservative block, wrote:
Imagine a Georgia citizen interested in learning his legal rights and duties. If he
reads the economy-class version of the Georgia Code available online, he will
see laws requiring political candidates to pay hefty qualification fees (with no
indigency exception), criminalizing broad categories of consensual sexual conduct, and exempting certain key evidence in criminal trials from standard evidentiary limitations—with no hint that important aspects of those laws have
been held unconstitutional by the Georgia Supreme Court. Meanwhile, firstclass readers with access to the annotations will be assured that these laws are, in
crucial respects, unenforceable relics that the legislature has not bothered to narrow or repeal.27

Justice Ginsburg was not persuaded by these access concerns. Instead, she
penned a dissent, joined by Justice Breyer, arguing that copyright protection
was proper because of the different roles played by judges and the timing of the

Sony, 464 U.S. at 485–86.
Id. at 492–93.
22 Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright Grab, WIRED (Jan. 1, 1996, 12:00 PM),
https://www.wired.com/1996/01/white-paper/ [https://perma.cc/9P6C-5TA4].
23 Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1498 (2020).
24 Id. at 1503–04.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 1512–13.
27 See id. at 1512 (citations omitted).
20
21
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annotations vis à vis the code.28 For those who saw Justice Ginsburg as consistently protecting David from Goliath, her dissent was shocking. In fairness, so
was Justice Breyer’s decision to sign on to it.
Irrespective of which understanding of the government edicts doctrine one
deems “correct,” the colloquy between the majority and the dissenters demonstrates that traditional political alignments have little to do with how Supreme
Court Justices interpret copyright law. Political leanings cannot explain Justice
Ginsburg’s copyright jurisprudence. This Article will undertake a holistic evaluation of Ginsburg’s copyright jurisprudence—identifying several themes running through her opinions in copyright cases and situating these themes within
Justice Ginsburg’s broader approach to judging.
Part I describes the most common aspect of Ginsburg’s copyright opinions—that she favored copyright owners—and critiques a few commonly proffered explanations for this. The next several Sections introduce and examine
the multiple themes running through Ginsburg’s copyright opinions. Part II focuses on her incremental approach to resolving copyright disputes and how this
incrementalism parallels her approach to gender equality litigation. Part III examines intergovernmental deference as part of a dialogue about legal developments and as a consequence of the judiciary’s institutional capacity limitations.
Part IV studies the role that alternative avenues of relief played in shaping
Ginsburg’s opinions. Part V explores Ginsburg’s stoicism and restraint, noting
that her frustration with her fellow Justices was sometimes evident, especially
toward the end of her career.
I.

FAVORING STRONG COPYRIGHT

The perception that Justice Ginsburg’s copyright opinions favored authors
and copyright owners is widespread and understandable.29 Of the sixteen opinions she authored (ten majority opinions, four concurrences, and two dissents),
eight favored copyright owners and five favored authors. However, when copyright opinions she joined but did not write are considered, the picture is a bit
less stark. She was clearly not a strong copyright absolutist and joined several
majority opinions in favor of accused copyright infringers. Most of these verId. at 1522–24 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
See Ryan Davis, Ginsburg Remembered as Steadfast Pro-Copyright Voice, LAW360
(Sept. 21, 2020, 11:26 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1312244/ginsburg-remember
ed-as-steadfast-pro-copyright-voice [https://perma.cc/SL4P-NKXJ] (“Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg’s steadfast support for copyright owners was one of the hallmarks of her U.S. Supreme Court tenure . . . .”); Eriq Gardner, A Supreme Court Without RBG May Impact Hollywood’s Grip on Intellectual Property, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Sept. 21, 2020, 2:18 PM),
https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/business/business-news/a-supreme-court-without-rbgmay-impact-hollywoods-grip-on-intellectual-property-4064367
[https://perma.cc/CRF46Q8F] (describing Ginsburg as the most “pro-copyright voice” on the Supreme Court); Ruth
Vitale, RBG Was a Champion for Creators, Too, THE HILL (Oct. 1, 2020, 1:30 PM),
https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/judicial/519152-rbg-was-a-champion-for-creatorstoo [https://perma.cc/J8MX-G2Z2].
28
29
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dicts were unanimous by vote; some included concurring opinions, but there
were no dissenters, so perhaps they were easy cases. Or possibly, Justice Ginsburg felt the gentle pull of peer pressure to go the way of her colleagues. In any
event, she was not always on the sides of copyright owners or authors.
The following Section catalogues Ginsburg’s copyright cases, evaluates the
claim that she favors copyright owners, and considers common explanations for
her “strong copyright” orientation.
A. Opinions in Favor of Authors
Five opinions Justice Ginsburg penned favored authors—four majority
opinions and one concurring opinion. These include New York Times Co. v.
Tasini,30 which featured authors who were fighting for their ownership rights
against publishers; Eldred v. Ashcroft,31 in which the constitutionality of the
Copyright Term Extension Act was challenged; Golan v. Holder,32 in which the
constitutionality of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act was challenged;
Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid,33 where an author argued he
was not subject to the work-made-for-hire doctrine; and, arguably, Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick,34 which raised questions about whether copyright registration was jurisdictional.
1. Majority Opinions
In New York Times v. Tasini,35 Ginsburg penned the majority opinion,
which empowered freelance journalists to collect copyright royalties that had
been wrongfully denied to them by corporate publishers and information distributors.36 The print publishers placed the journalists’ articles in electronic
publishers’ databases, such as Lexis/Nexis, without payment or permission.37
The publishers claimed that the privileges accorded to collective work copyright owners by § 201(c) applied to them.38 Justice Ginsburg rejected the publishers’ argument and explained:
The publishers are not sheltered by § 201(c), we conclude, because the databases
reproduce and distribute articles standing alone and not in context, not “as part
of that particular collective work” to which the author contributed, “as part
of . . . any revision” thereof, or “as part of . . . any later collective work in the

30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38

N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001).
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302 (2012).
Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 846 F.2d 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154 (2010).
Tasini, 533 U.S. 483.
See id. at 488.
Id. at 489.
Id. at 492.
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same series.” Both the print publishers and the electronic publishers, we rule,
have infringed the copyrights of the freelance authors.39

Her majority opinion was joined by every conservative Justice. Justice
Thomas, who has a well-known penchant for explicitly grounding his opinions
in statutory texts,40 was likely particularly pleased by Justice Ginsburg’s framing of the issue. Only Justices Stevens and Breyer dissented.41 The dissenters
were concerned that if the authors prevailed, any effective remedy could result
in the removal of a tremendous number of articles from public access.42 Justice
Ginsburg and the other majority members focused instead on the importance of
the authors getting the full benefit of their copyrights.43
Another author-friendly, “strong copyright” leaning decision by Justice
Ginsburg is her majority opinion in Eldred v. Ashcroft.44 Eldred addressed the
question of whether the Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA) failed constitutional review under the IP Clause of the U.S. Constitution’s “limited Times”
prescription, and under the First Amendment’s free speech guarantee.45 The
lead plaintiff, Eldred, was a book publisher who specialized in distributing textual works that were in the public domain.46 Eldred asserted that Congress erred
by enlarging the term for existing published works with subsisting copyrights
because “[t]he ‘limited Tim[e]’ in effect when a copyright is secured . . . becomes the constitutional boundary [for the length of copyright protection], a clear line beyond the power of Congress to extend.”47 Eldred also
argued that the CTEA was “a content-neutral regulation of speech that fail[ed]
inspection under the heightened judicial scrutiny appropriate for such regulations,” and therefore violated the First Amendment.48 Justice Ginsburg concluded that the CTEA did not violate either provision of the Constitution and
that Congress was authorized to extend protection to copyright owners.49 Her
Id. at 488. Ginsburg’s focus on an authorial rights theory rather than an incentive theory
has been noticed by others. See Sara K. Stadler, Incentive and Expectation in Copyright, 58
HASTINGS L.J. 433, 465 (2007) (“In 2001, this sentiment made its way into the majority opinion in New York Times Co. v. Tasini, in which Justice Ginsburg made no mention of incentives, focusing exclusively on the idea of authorial right.”).
40 See John F. Manning, Second-Generation Textualism, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1287, 1311
(2010) (describing Justices Thomas and Scalia as the Court’s most committed textualists);
see also H. Brent McKnight, The Emerging Contours of Justice Thomas’s Textualism, 12
REGENT U. L. REV. 365, 365–77 (2000); see, e.g., Star Athletica, LLC v. Varsity Brands,
Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002 (2017) (Thomas, J.) (articulating the separability test with heavy emphasis on the statutory text or ordinary meaning).
41 Tasini, 533 U.S. at 506 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
42 Id. at 519–20.
43 Id. at 497–99 (majority opinion).
44 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
45 Id. at 193 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
46 Id.
47 Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
48 Id. at 193–94.
49 Id. at 194.
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reasoning can be sardonically paraphrased as, “It is not unconstitutional for
Congress to make dumb policy decisions.”
Golan v. Holder asked whether the URAA, which restored copyright protection to foreign works that had fallen into the public domain in the United
States, violated the IP Clause and First Amendment because it was removing
material from the public domain.50 The plaintiffs, orchestra conductors, educators, performers, publishers, film archivists, and distributors,51 sought to distinguish Eldred, which had affirmed Congress’s power to extend existing copyrights. Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority, concluded that the URAA did
not violate either constitutional provision and that Congress had the power to
restore copyright protection to foreign works.52
The majority opinion in Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid,53
which Ginsburg wrote as a judge on the D.C. Circuit, also favored an author.
James Earl Reid was a sculptor, hired by CCNV to create a sculpture that
dramatized the plight of homelessness.54 Following completion of the sculpture, entitled “Third World America,” CCNV and Reid each claimed ownership
of the work’s copyright.55 CCNV asserted that it owned the copyright because
it was a work made for hire.56 Then-Judge Ginsburg rejected CCNV’s argument and held that the sculpture was not a work made for hire, thus entitling
Reid, the author, to ownership of the copyright.57
2. Concurring Opinion
Finally, Reed Elsevier v. Muchnick58 can be interpreted as favoring authors,
but not emphatically so. The Copyright Act generally requires copyright holders to register their works before they can sue for copyright infringement.59
Muchnick, an offshoot of the litigation in Tasini,60 was a consolidated, classaction copyright infringement suit. The plaintiff authors alleged that they “each
own[ed] at least one copyright, typically in a freelance article written for a
newspaper or a magazine, that they had registered in accordance with § 411(a)”
of the Copyright Act.61 “The class, however, included both authors who had
registered their copyrighted works and authors who had not.”62 The Court ma50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62

Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302, 307–08 (2012).
Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1181 (10th Cir. 2007).
Golan, 565 U.S. at 308.
Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 846 F.2d 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
Id. at 1487.
Id. at 1488 (showing the parties disputed who owned the statue itself).
See id.
Id. at 1494.
Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154 (2010).
17 U.S.C. § 411(a).
Muchnick, 559 U.S. at 158.
Id.
Id.
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jority held that § 411(a)’s registration requirement is a precondition to filing a
copyright infringement claim but that a copyright holder’s failure to comply
with that requirement did not restrict a federal court’s subject-matter jurisdiction over infringement claims involving unregistered works.63
Justice Ginsburg concurred but wrote separately to clarify how two prior
cases that established a jurisdictional requirement could be reconciled.64 Although Muchnick favored the settling authors over the authors who objected to
the settlement, we classified Muchnick as favoring authors because the vast majority of authors chose to settle.65
B. Opinions in Favor of Owners
Many of Justice Ginsburg’s written opinions came in cases that were decided in favor copyright owners. In addition to Eldred and Golan, which are
beneficial to both authors and owners, Ginsburg authored eight opinions in
which copyright owners prevailed. She authored the majority opinions in four:
Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc.,66 National Cable Television Ass’n v.
Copyright Royalty Tribunal,67 Atari Games v. Oman I,68 and Atari Games v.
Oman II.69 She wrote concurring opinions in two: Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.70 and Star Athletica, LLC. v. Varsity Brands, Inc.71
And she penned dissenting opinions in two: Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons,
Inc. I72 and Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org., Inc.73 In addition, Ginsburg
joined four other opinions in favor of copyright owners: American Broadcasting Cos. v. Aereo, Inc.,74 Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. II,75 Walt Disney
Co. v. Powell,76 and Cablevision Systems Development Co. v. Motion Picture
Ass’n of America II.77
Id. at 169, 171.
Id. at 171–74.
65 See id. at 159 (noting that only ten freelance authors objected).
66 Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 572 U.S. 663 (2014).
67 Nat’l Cable TV Ass’n v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 724 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
68 Atari Games Corp. v. Oman (Atari I), 888 F.2d 878 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
69 Atari Games Corp. v. Oman (Atari II), 979 F.2d 242 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
70 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 941 (2005) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
71 Star Athletica, LLC v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1018 (2017) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring).
72 Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (Kirtsaeng I), 568 U.S. 519 (2013) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
73 Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org., Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1498, 1522 (2020) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
74 Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 573 U.S. 431 (2014).
75 Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (Kirtsaeng II), 579 U.S. 197 (2016).
76 Walt Disney Co. v. Powell, 897 F.2d 565 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
77 Cablevision Sys. Dev. Co. v. Motion Picture Ass’n of Am. (MPAA II), 836 F.2d 599
(D.C. Cir. 1988).
63
64
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1. Majority Opinions
Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion in Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer,
Inc.78 illustrates a strong commitment to copyright holders. The Court was
asked to decide whether the equitable defense of laches was available as a defense to damages for copyright infringement.79 Justice Ginsburg was joined by
another unconventional grouping of Justices when she wrote that laches was
not available to preclude a claim for damages brought within the three-year
statute of limitations period.80 Justices Scalia, Thomas, Alito, Sotomayor, and
Kagan signed on to her majority opinion, which concluded that laches is not
available to copyright defendants in claims for damages.81 This means that accused infringers cannot not use laches to escape litigation before the statute of
limitations period expires.82 Petrella’s holding is therefore very favorable to
copyright owners who have delayed filing infringement suits for strategic or
other reasons.
Chief Justice Roberts joined Justices Breyer and Kennedy in dissent, asserting that laches was available as a remedy because when Congress enacted a
uniform statute of limitations for copyright claims in 1957, it did not indicate
that it also sought to bar the operation of laches.83 The Copyright Act is silent
on the subject, and the dissenters believed that this “silence [was] consistent,
not inconsistent, with the application of equitable doctrines.”84
The Copyright Act protects works that were published before 1978 for an
initial twenty-eight-year term, which is renewable for another sixty-seven
years.85 If an author who assigned her copyrights died during the initial copyright term, the assignee could only continue to use the work if the author’s heirs
or successors transferred the renewal rights to the assignee.86 The Petrella dispute concerned the movie Raging Bull, which was based on the life of boxer
Jake LaMotta.87 Petrella and LaMotta co-authored a screenplay that was copyrighted in 1963.88 In 1976, they assigned their rights and renewal rights, which
were later acquired by Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer (MGM).89 In 1980, MGM released, and registered a copyright in, Raging Bull.90 Petrella died during the initial copyright term, so his renewal rights reverted to his daughter, who renewed
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90

Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 572 U.S. 663 (2014).
Id. at 667.
Id.
Id. at 666–67.
Id. at 667.
Id. at 688, 693–94 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 694.
17 U.S.C. § 304(a).
Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 221 (1990).
Petrella, 572 U.S. at 673.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the 1963 copyright in 1991.91 Seven years later, she advised MGM that it was
violating her copyright.92 Nine years later, she filed suit, seeking damages and
injunctive relief for violations occurring after January 5, 2006.93 The district
court dismissed the case, citing laches,94 and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.95 But
the Supreme Court reversed, holding that laches cannot bar a claim for damages brought within the three-year statute of limitations.96 Noting the “essentially
gap-filling, not legislation-overriding,” nature of laches, Justice Ginsburg declared that the Court had “never applied laches to bar in their entirety claims for
discrete wrongs occurring within a federally prescribed limitations period” before, and was not going to do so in Petrella either.97
There are also three “strong copyright,” owner-friendly Ginsburg majority
opinions that arose during her time on the D.C. Circuit. In National Cable Television Ass’n v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal,98 then-Judge Ginsburg had to decide whether the Copyright Royalty Tribunal (CRT) abused its discretion in
setting rates for cable TV compulsory licenses.99 The CRT was empowered by
Congress to adjust royalty rates paid by cable TV operators to copyright owners
for carrying broadcasts of the copyrighted programs.100 The CRT determined
the rates for the compulsory license, but the cable TV operators were dissatisfied and appealed.101 Judge Ginsburg affirmed the CRT’s royalty rates, which
were beneficial for the copyright owners.102
Then-Judge Ginsburg also penned copyright-owner-friendly opinions in
Atari I103 and Atari II.104 The Atari cases involved the copyrightability of the
videogame Breakout.105 Atari attempted to register a copyright in Breakout, but
the Copyright Office refused to issue a registration.106 Atari appealed to the
D.C. Circuit, and then-Judge Ginsburg reversed the Copyright Office’s decision.107 She also remanded for further consideration because the Copyright Of-

Id. at 673–74.
Id. at 674.
93 Id. at 674–75.
94 Id. at 675.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 667, 686.
97 Id. at 680.
98 Nat’l Cable TV Ass’n v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 724 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
99 Id. at 179.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 181.
102 See id. at 190.
103 Atari I, 888 F.2d 878 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
104 Atari II, 979 F.2d 242 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
105 Atari I, 888 F.2d at 879.
106 Id.
107 Id.
91
92
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fice had failed to adequately explain how it was evaluating originality.108 This
decision let the copyright owner continue its fight for registration.
Upon remand, the Copyright Office again determined that Breakout was
uncopyrightable.109 Ginsburg again reversed and remanded the case to the
Copyright Office for further consideration in light of the Supreme Court’s intervening decision in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.110
In Feist Publications, the Supreme Court explained that the amount of originality required for a work to be copyrightable was very small.111 The message
then-Judge Ginsburg sent to the Copyright Office was not subtle.
Next, we turn to four copyright cases in which Ginsburg did not author an
opinion. Instead, she joined four majority opinions in favor of copyright owners. First, in American Broadcasting Cos. v. Aereo, Inc.,112 the Court had to determine whether a company publicly performs a copyrighted television program when it retransmits a broadcast of that program to individual subscribers
over the internet.113 Justice Ginsburg joined the majority opinion holding that
the rebroadcasting company had infringed the owners’ copyrights.114
Second, in Kirtsaeng II,115 the Court addressed the standards for determining whether attorney’s fees should be awarded to a prevailing party in a copyright infringement case.116 Under § 505, a court may in its discretion award a
reasonable attorney’s fee to the prevailing party.117 Courts are supposed to
make case-by-case assessments and look at various relevant factors, such as
whether a claim was frivolous; what a party’s motivation was; a claim’s objective unreasonableness; and considerations such as compensation and deterrence.118 In Kirtsaeng II, a unanimous Court held that substantial weight should
be given to the objective reasonableness of the losing party’s position, but that
other factors also need to be considered.119 Although this decision was favorable to the copyright owner as applied, the general approach established by the
Supreme Court is even-handed because both copyright owning plaintiffs and
accused infringers may be prevailing parties for purposes of recovering attorney’s fees.

Id. at 881.
Atari II, 979 F.2d at 243.
110 Id. at 247.
111 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 358 (1991) (“[T]he originality
requirement is not particularly stringent.”).
112 Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 573 U.S. 431 (2014).
113 Id. at 436.
114 Id. at 434, 451.
115 Kirtsaeng II, 579 U.S. 197 (2016).
116 Id. at 199–200.
117 17 U.S.C. § 505.
118 Kirtsaeng II, 579 U.S. at 202.
119 Id. at 209.
108
109
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The third case is Walt Disney Co. v. Powell.120 The defendant in Powell
sold souvenirs to local tourists through street vendors.121 Included in his wares
were shirts with unauthorized depictions of Mickey and Minnie Mouse.122 After being sued for copyright infringement, he admitted liability.123 But he asserted on appeal that because he had voluntarily ceased his activities, an injunction should not issue, attorney’s fees were improper, and statutory damages had
been improperly calculated.124 Then-Judge Ginsburg joined Judge Wald’s opinion for a unanimous panel, affirming the district court’s injunction and award
of attorney fees.125 Once again, a copyright owner prevailed thanks in part to
then-Judge Ginsburg.
The final case in which Ginsburg voted for copyright owners is MPAA
II.126 This case, like National Cable Television, involved compulsory royalties
for cable TV stations.127 The MPAA II dispute concerned standards for calculating compulsory license payments.128 The cable companies argued that revenues
from non-broadcast channels or tiers should not count toward the gross receipts
calculation, thus lowering the amount the cable TV stations needed to pay.129
The court, in a unanimous opinion written by Judge Silberman, held that the
Copyright Office’s regulation, which required inclusion of all revenue from a
tier containing at least one retransmitted broadcast signal, was reasonable.130
The court’s rejection of a prorated approach benefitted copyright owners in the
calculation of license fees.
2.

Concurring Opinions

Justice Ginsburg’s concurring opinion in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios
Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.131 also benefits copyright owners. A group of motion picture studios, recording companies, music publishers, and songwriters brought a
lawsuit against the makers of the Morpheus, Grokster, and KaZaA online filesharing software.132 The plaintiff content owners wanted to shut down distribution of this software, and to set a precedent to use against other technology

Walt Disney Co. v. Powell, 897 F.2d 565 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
Id. at 567.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 568–69.
125 Id. at 566.
126 MPAA II, 836 F.2d 599 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
127 Id. at 602.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 605.
130 Id. at 614.
131 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 941 (2005) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
132 Id. at 920–21 (majority opinion).
120
121
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companies.133 The Justices were unanimous in their belief that the online filesharing services could be liable for copyright infringement.134 Justice Ginsburg
wrote separately to assert that the Court’s watershed opinion in Sony should be
narrowly interpreted so as to not extend its protection to new technologies and
services where significant non-infringing uses have not yet been established.135
Another opinion in which the copyright owner triumphed is Star Athletica,
LLC v. Varsity Brands, Inc.136 In Star Athletica, the Court was tasked with explaining how to determine whether the design of a useful article was conceptually separable from its utilitarian aspects.137 The plaintiff asserted copyright
ownership over the lines, chevrons, and colorful shapes appearing on cheerleading uniforms that it designed, made, and sold.138 The Court held that the
designs were separable and entitled to protection, affirming the validity of Varsity Brands’ disputed copyright registrations.139 Justice Ginsburg penned a concurrence to explain that the thorny question of separability need not have been
addressed because the designs at issue appeared on the cheerleading outfits and
thus were not useful articles.140
3. Dissenting Opinions
Two cases in which copyright owners lost—leading to strong dissenting
opinions by Justice Ginsburg—are Kirtsaeng I141 and Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc.142
Copyright law’s first sale doctrine, codified in § 109, provides that an individual who purchases a copy of a copyrighted work from the copyright holder
has the right to sell, display, or otherwise dispose of that particular copy, notwithstanding any interests of the copyright owner.143 In Kirtsaeng I,144 the
Court had to decide whether the first sale doctrine was limited to works that
were lawfully made in the United States.145 If the first sale doctrine were geographically unrestricted, lawful copies manufactured and sold abroad could be
imported into the United States and sold domestically without violating any of

See id. at 921.
Id. at 941; id. at 941–42, 949 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
135 Grokster, 545 U.S. at 945 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
136 Star Athletica, LLC v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1016 (2017).
137 Id. at 1007.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 1018 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
141 Kirtsaeng I, 568 U.S. 519, 525 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
142 Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org., Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1498, 1522 (2020) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
143 17 U.S.C. § 109(a).
144 Kirtsaeng I, 568 U.S. 519.
145 Id. at 525.
133
134
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the copyright owner’s rights.146 The defendant, Supap Kirtsaeng, imported
comparatively inexpensive English language textbooks from Thailand and sold
them in the United States.147 One copyright owner, publisher John Wiley &
Son, sued Kirtsaeng for violating its exclusive right to distribute its copyrighted
works.148 Kirtsaeng defended on the basis of the first sale doctrine.149
The Court adopted the concept of international exhaustion, which shields
importers of foreign-manufactured copies, like Kirtsaeng, from copyright liability.150 Justice Ginsburg dissented.151 She believed that the scope of the first sale
doctrine should be limited to works that were originally produced in the United
States and not extended to foreign-made copies.152 She would have held that
Kirtsaeng infringed John Wiley & Son’s distribution rights.153
Finally, in Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc.,154 Justice Ginsburg wrote
a dissent in which she opined that Georgia was entitled to copyright protection
for the annotations accompanying its official statutory code.155 Justice Ginsburg
believed that Georgia should be able to enjoin a public interest organization
from copying and distributing copies of the Georgia Code that included the annotations.156
C. Opinions in Favor of Accused Infringers
Ginsburg has also written and voted in favor of parties accused of copyright infringement rather than authors or owners. She authored the majority
opinions in Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC157 and
OddzOn Products, Inc. v. Oman,158 as well as a concurring opinion in Quality
King Distributors, Inc. v. L’anza Research International, Inc.159 She also joined
seven opinions in which accused infringers prevailed: Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
Music, Inc.,160 Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc.,161 Feltner v. Columbia Pictures TeleviId.
Id. at 527.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id. at 525.
151 Id. at 557 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
152 Id. at 587.
153 Id. (“Kirtsaeng’s unauthorized importation of the foreign-made textbooks involved in
this case infringed Wiley’s copyrights.”).
154 Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org., Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1498 (2020).
155 Id. at 1522–24.
156 Id.
157 Fourth Est. Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC (Fourth Estate), 139 S. Ct. 881
(2019).
158 OddzOn Prods., Inc. v. Oman, 924 F.2d 346 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
159 Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L’anza Research Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 154 (1998)
(Ginsburg, J., concurring).
160 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
161 Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994).
146
147

22 NEV. L.J. 431

448

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 22:2

sion, Inc.,162 Allen v. Cooper,163 Rimini Street, Inc. v. Oracle USA, Inc.,164 Cablevision Systems Development Co. v. Motion Picture Ass’n of America I,165
and National Broadcasting Co. v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal.166
1. Majority Opinions
Under § 411(a) of the Copyright Act, a civil action for copyright infringement cannot be lawfully instituted until preregistration or registration of the
copyright at issue has been made.167 In Fourth Estate, the question presented
was whether the copyright registration requirement was met by filing an application with the Copyright Office, or only upon actual registration by the Copyright Office.168 When Fourth Estate, a news organization, sued Wall-Street.com
for copyright infringement, Fourth Estate had applied to register the disputed
articles with the Copyright Office, but the Register had not yet acted on those
applications.169 Justice Ginsburg wrote for the majority, which held that registration occurs when the Copyright Office registers a copyright, not upon the filing of an application.170 This holding means that there are no shortcuts. Copyright holders can no longer simply apply for a copyright registration at the same
time they file an infringement claim with respect to the same copyrighted work.
Now, they need to complete the registration process first. The ruling therefore
has the potential to harm copyright owners, and consequently benefit accused
infringers, by delaying their ability to file suit for infringement when they have
not previously registered the copyright in a contested work.
OddzOn v. Oman addressed whether the Copyright Office erred in refusing
to register the copyright of a KOOSH ball.171 According to then-Judge Ginsburg, a “KOOSH ball is a patented, trademarked product formed of hundreds of
floppy, wiggly, elastomeric filaments radiating from a core.”172 Given the
KOOSH ball’s patented and trademarked nature, perhaps it is no surprise that
its manufacturer would go for an intellectual property hat trick and attempt to
obtain a copyright registration for it as well. However, the Copyright Office
concluded that the KOOSH ball did not reflect the minimal degree of creativity
162

Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340 (1998).
Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 1008 (2020) (Breyer, J., concurring).
164 Rimini Street, Inc. v. Oracle USA, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 873 (2019).
165 Cablevision Sys. Dev. Co. v. Motion Picture Ass’n of Am. (MPAA I), 808 F.2d 133
(D.C. Cir. 1987).
166 Nat’l Broad. Co. v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal (NBC v. CRT), 848 F.2d 1289 (D.C. Cir.
1988).
167 17 U.S.C. § 411(a).
168 Fourth Est. Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC (Fourth Estate), 139 S. Ct. 881,
886 (2019).
169 Id. at 887.
170 Id. at 892.
171 OddzOn Prods., Inc. v. Oman, 924 F.2d 346, 347 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
172 Id.
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required for a copyright.173 Then-Judge Ginsburg agreed with the district court
and held that it was not an abuse of discretion for the Copyright Office to decide that the KOOSH ball’s purportedly expressive elements were dependent
upon, and inseparable from, the utilitarian features of the object, and hence not
protectable by copyright.174 But even in this case, which clearly disadvantaged
the creator of the KOOSH ball, Ginsburg kept her opinion narrow. She concluded by emphasizing that the court was only deciding whether refusal to register was an abuse of discretion, and that the court was not deciding the copyrightability of the product, carefully writing:
[W]e again emphasize that we decide simply and only that the refusal of the
Copyright Office to register the KOOSH ball, in the circumstances here presented, does not constitute an abuse of discretion. We do not decide on the copyrightability of the item, and we intimate no opinion on the decision we would
reach if the matter came before us in an infringement action.175

Thus, OddzOn was left without a copyright registration for its KOOSH
ball,176 but then-Judge Ginsburg avoided holding that the work lacked sufficient originality to be copyrightable.177
Justice Ginsburg also joined opinions in several copyright cases where accused infringers prevailed. Justice Ginsburg’s first copyright case on the Supreme Court bench was Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.178 Campbell was a
dispute over a parodic rap version of the Roy Orbison/William Dees song Oh
Pretty Woman by the band Two Live Crew, which was part of a commercially
distributed album called As Clean as We Wanna Be.179 Accused of copyright
infringement, the defendants successfully convinced the Court that making a
parody of Oh Pretty Woman using different lyrics and just enough of the melody to make the parody recognizable was a fair use of the song and therefore not
infringing.180 Justice Ginsburg joined the unanimous-by-vote opinion authored
by Justice Souter.181
In Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc.,182 musician John Fogerty was accused of writing a new song that infringed the copyright in a previous song he authored.183
Fogerty wrote a song called Run Through the Jungle in 1970 and sold the pub-

Id. at 348.
Id. at 350 (“We are satisfied, however, that the Copyright Office was not arbitrary in adhering to a line similar to the one taken by our sister circuit.”).
175 Id.
176 See Dotan Oliar et al., Copyright Registrations: Who, What, When, Where, and Why, 92
TEX. L. REV. 2211, 2215–16 (2014) (describing the benefits of copyright registration).
177 OddzOn Prods., 924 F.2d at 350.
178 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
179 Id. at 572–73.
180 Id. at 594.
181 See id. at 571.
182 Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994).
183 Id. at 519–20.
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lishing rights to Fantasy’s predecessor-in-interest.184 In 1985 he wrote the song
The Old Man Down the Road and was sued by Fantasy for infringing the copyright in Run Through the Jungle.185 Fantasy alleged that the songs were substantially similar.186
A jury found in favor of Fogerty, and he sought attorney’s fees as the prevailing party.187 The district court denied him attorney’s fees, and the Court of
Appeals affirmed.188 The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that it
was incorrect to apply different standards to prevailing plaintiffs and prevailing
defendants.189 Instead, the Court explained that courts should apply the same
standard for awarding attorneys’ fees, and prevailing plaintiffs should not be
given preferential treatment.190
Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc.191 addressed whether the
Seventh Amendment provides a right to a jury trial on statutory damages.192
The accused infringer, Feltner, owned three television stations that had licensed
several shows.193 After Feltner failed to make payments, the licenses were terminated, but Feltner continued to broadcast the shows.194 Columbia sued Feltner and sought statutory damages.195 Feltner requested a jury trial on the issue
of statutory damages, but the district court refused,196 and the Court of Appeals
affirmed.197 The Supreme Court reversed and held that the Seventh Amendment provides a right to a jury trial on statutory damages.198 Although this decision was favorable to the accused infringer, the general approach established by
the Supreme Court is even-handed because both copyright owners and users
may request a jury trial on statutory damages.
Rimini Street, Inc. v. Oracle USA, Inc.199 is another unanimous Supreme
Court opinion decided in favor of an accused infringer that was joined by Justice Ginsburg. Rimini required the Court to decide what the correct meaning
was of the term “full costs” in § 505 of the Copyright Act.200 Oracle sued Rimini for making unlawful copies of its software while providing support ser184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
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199
200

Id. at 519.
Id. at 519–20.
Id. at 520.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 533, 535.
Id. at 534.
Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340 (1998).
Id. at 342.
Id.
Id. at 342–43.
Id. at 343.
Id. at 344.
Id. at 344–45.
Id. at 355.
Rimini Street, Inc. v. Oracle USA, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 873 (2019).
Id. at 876.
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vices to Oracle customers.201 The jury found in favor of Oracle and awarded it
$35.6 million in damages.202 The district court then awarded $4.95 million in
costs and $12.8 million for litigation expenses, including expert witnesses, ediscovery, and jury consulting.203 Rimini challenged the $12.8 million in litigation expenses as going beyond the list of permitted costs recoverable against a
losing party.204 The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s litigation expenses award, but the Supreme Court reversed.205 The Supreme Court held that
the Copyright Act’s provision permitting recovery of costs is limited to the
same costs specifically described in the general cost recovery statute.206 Thus,
Oracle was unable to recover the $12.8 million for litigation expenses.
The final cases decided in favor of an accused infringer are from Ginsburg’s time on the D.C. Circuit. The first arose out of disputes between Cablevision Systems Development Company and the Motion Picture Association
of America over the rate-setting procedures and compulsory license distribution
scheme under § 111 for cable TV stations.207 Cablevision, a cable TV company, filed two lawsuits challenging the required royalty payments.208 The National Cable Television Association (NCTA) filed a third lawsuit with similar
allegations.209 In the third case, the district court ordered the NCTA to join the
Copyright Office and Register of Copyrights as necessary parties.210 The lawsuits were consolidated, and the district court issued a final order disposing of
all three cases together.211 Cablevision, a party to all three cases, filed a notice
of appeal sixty days after the final order.212
Initially the D.C. Circuit needed to determine whether the notice of appeal
for Cablevision’s first two cases needed to be filed within thirty or sixty
days.213 Rule 4(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure requires thirty
days, but this is extended to sixty days if a federal agency is a party.214 Because
the Copyright Office was a party in one of the three cases, the D.C. Circuit held
that the sixty-day period applied to all three appeals.215 Thus, Cablevision’s ap-

Id.
Id.
203 Id.
204 Id.
205 Id. at 876, 881.
206 Id. at 881.
207 MPAA I, 808 F.2d 133, 133–34 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
208 Cablevision Co. v. Motion Picture Ass’n of Am., Inc., 641 F. Supp. 1154, 1154–55
(D.D.C. 1986).
209 MPAA I, 808 F.2d at 134.
210 Id. at 134–35.
211 Id. at 135.
212 Id.
213 Id.
214 Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 4(a)(1)).
215 Id. at 135–36.
201
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peal could move forward on the merits.216 Although the accused infringer prevailed, the interpretation of Rule 4(a)(1) is even handed because either copyright owners or accused infringers could be the appellant.
The remaining opinion decided in favor of an accused infringer and joined
by then-Judge Ginsburg is NBC v. CRT,217 another cable TV compulsory licensing case. NBC had licensed Worldvision Enterprises to retransmit NBC’s
popular TV show, Little House on the Prairie.218 When compulsory license
fees were collected, both NBC and Worldvision asserted claims to the fees.219
The CRT awarded the fees to Worldvision.220 NBC appealed and asserted that
the CRT erred by distributing royalties to the syndicator of a TV program rather than the creator of the program.221 The D.C. Circuit, in an opinion by
Judge Silberman, held that the CRT did not err in distributing the royalties to
the syndicator, thus favoring the user over the copyright owner.222
2. Concurring Opinions
Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L’anza Research International, Inc.223
addressed whether copyright law’s first sale doctrine applied to imported copies.224 Plaintiff L’anza sold its hair care products in the United States exclusively to distributors who agreed to resell within limited geographic areas and only
to authorized retailers.225 The company promoted its domestic sales with extensive advertising.226 In foreign markets, however, it did not engage in comparable advertising or promotion, and charged prices that were substantially lower
than its domestic prices.227 L’anza was using copyright law to segment the
market and engage in price discrimination.228
L’anza’s United Kingdom distributor sold several tons of L’anza products,
affixed with copyrighted labels, to a distributor in Malta, which sold the goods
to Quality King.229 Quality King then imported the goods back into the United
States without L’anza’s permission and resold them at discounted prices to unauthorized retailers.230 L’anza filed suit, alleging that Quality King’s actions
See id. at 136.
Nat’l Broad. Co. v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal (NBC v. CRT), 848 F.2d 1289 (D.C. Cir.
1988).
218 Id. at 1290.
219 Id.
220 Id. at 1291.
221 Id.
222 Id.
223 Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L’anza Research Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135 (1998).
224 Id.
225 Id. at 138.
226 Id. at 139.
227 Id.
228 Id.
229 Id.
230 Id.
216
217
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violated L’anza’s distribution rights for the copyrighted labels.231 The Supreme
Court majority, however, concluded that the first sale doctrine was applicable
to imported copies.232 Justice Ginsburg concurred that the shampoo labels in
Quality King were subject to the first sale doctrine, thus enforcing statutory
limits on the copyright in that case.233 However, she explicitly argued in her
short concurrence that the first sale doctrine was limited to situations in which
the copyrighted works were produced in the United States and made round-trip
voyages—exported before returning to the United States for subsequent sale.234
This restrictive view of the first sale doctrine would be very favorable to copyright owners seeking to control the international distribution of their works, if
adopted.
In Allen v. Cooper,235 the question was whether the Copyright Remedy
Clarification Act of 1990 (CRCA), which abrogated states’ sovereign immunity
for infringement, violated the Eleventh Amendment.236 Allen, a videographer,
created videos and photos of efforts to recover the pirate Blackbeard’s ship,
Queen Anne’s Revenge.237 North Carolina published some of Allen’s videos
and photos on its web site without permission, and used a photo in a newsletter.238 Allen sued North Carolina, but North Carolina moved to dismiss the suit
based on sovereign immunity.239 Allen relied on the CRCA,240 and the district
court agreed with Allen that the state could not invoke sovereign immunity.241
However, the Fourth Circuit reversed and held that the CRCA had no valid
constitutional basis and therefore violated the Eleventh Amendment.242 A unanimous-by-vote Supreme Court held that Congress lacked authority to abrogate
the states’ sovereign immunity from copyright infringement suits in the
CRCA.243 In consequence, North Carolina was immune from an infringement
suit.244
In addition to joining all of her colleagues by voting with the majority
opinion, Justice Ginsburg joined Justice Breyer’s concurrence, in which he
wrote:
In [the majority’s] view, Congress’ power under the Intellectual Property Clause
cannot support a federal law providing that, when proven to have pirated intel231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
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244

Id. at 139–40.
Id. at 145.
Id. at 154 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
Id.
Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994 (2020).
Id. at 998–1000.
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lectual property, States must pay for what they plundered. To subject nonconsenting States to private suits for copyright or patent infringement, says the
Court, Congress must endeavor to pass a more “tailored statute” than the one before us, relying not on the Intellectual Property Clause, but on § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Whether a future legislative effort along those lines will
pass constitutional muster is anyone’s guess. But faced with the risk of unfairness to authors and inventors alike, perhaps Congress will venture into this great
constitutional unknown.
That our sovereign-immunity precedents can be said to call for so uncertain a
voyage suggests that something is amiss.245

Justices Breyer and Ginsburg were clearly unhappy that the copyright
owner could not enforce its copyright against North Carolina, but they felt
bound by precedent to vote with the majority.246 Justice Breyer ruefully noted:
[W]e went astray in Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, as I have consistently
maintained. We erred again in Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd.
v. College Savings Bank by holding that Congress exceeded its § 5 powers when
it passed a patent counterpart to the copyright statute at issue here. But recognizing that my longstanding view has not carried the day, and that the Court’s decision in Florida Prepaid controls this case, I concur in the judgment.247

In sum, Justice Ginsburg was an important voice in twenty-seven copyright
law cases. Of the sixteen copyright opinions authored by Justice Ginsburg and
eleven opinions she joined, five were decided in favor of authors, twelve were
decided in favor of copyright owners, and ten were decided in favor of accused
infringers.248 Although it is probably fair to say that Justice Ginsburg generally
favored copyright owners and strong copyright protection, it is inaccurate to
claim that she overwhelmingly did so.
On balance, Justice Ginsburg was more conservative in her approach to
copyright law than she was with respect to gender equality and racial discrimination and social justice generally. It’s worth noting that not all copyright cases
can be styled as David versus Goliath battles. Many are more appropriately categorized as Goliath versus Goliath.249 But overall, she could fairly be characterized as at least a moderate fan of strong copyright protections.

Id. at 1009 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
Id.
247 Id. (citations omitted).
248 As noted, some interpretations of the law in these opinions are even-handed as a general
matter and could be classified otherwise given different facts.
249 See, e.g., Fourth Est. Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC (Fourth Estate), 139 S.
Ct. 881 (2019); Star Athletica, LLC v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002 (2017); MetroGoldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
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D. Common, but Unpersuasive, Explanations for Justice Ginsburg’s “Strong
Copyright” Tendencies
What drove Justice Ginsburg’s inclination toward strong copyright protections? Two possible explanations have been raised previously in the literature.
Neither are persuasive.
The first is that Ginsburg’s widely known love of opera and art caused her
to be sympathetic and protective toward composers and other creators.250 This
is a superficial explanation and unconvincing. Other Supreme Court justices
enjoy music, art, and literature, but we do not see this driving their opinions in
copyright law cases. Justice Breyer has a love of literature, for example,251 but
is the jurist most critical of copyright’s expansionism and is often on the opposite side of copyright disputes with Ginsburg.252 His skepticism of strong copyright protection can be charted from his famous law review article, The Uneasy
Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs.253
For a jurist as principled as Ruth Bader Ginsburg, it is difficult to believe
she would consciously or intentionally interpret the law simply to favor those
responsible for a favorite pastime. This is also an unsatisfying explanation because surely she was aware of the research demonstrating how weak the links
are between copyright law and the ways human authors behave. While a study
by Michela Giorcelli and Petra Moser demonstrated that copyright protections
appeared to positively influence the quantity and quality of Italian operas, it also showed that increasing the duration of copyright protections beyond the life
of opera creators did not have a similar effect.254 Ironically, Justice Ginsburg’s
opinion in Eldred affirmed Congress’s decision to extend most copyright protections by twenty years, even though extending copyright protections decades
further beyond the deaths of authors keeps existing operas under copyright restrictions for a much longer time, without offering effective incentives to compose new ones. Lengthening the copyrights in works created by deceased auSee Davis, supra note 29 (“Some speculate that her renowned love of opera and the arts
gave her a sense that copyright is an important part of the cultural landscape . . . .”).
251 On Reading Proust: Stephen Breyer, Interviewed by Ioanna Kohler, N.Y. REVIEW (Nov.
7, 2013), https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2013/11/07/reading-proust/ [perma.cc/74N9-8
GZJ] (interview with Justice Breyer describing his love of literature).
252 See, e.g., Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 572 U.S. 663 (2014) (Justice Ginsburg
for the majority and Justice Breyer dissenting); Kirtsaeng I, 568 U.S. 519 (2013) (Justice
Breyer for the majority and Justice Ginsburg dissenting); Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302
(2012) (Justice Ginsburg for the majority and Justice Breyer dissenting); Grokster, 545 U.S.
at 942–49 (Justice Ginsburg arguing for a narrow interpretation of Sony and Justice Breyer
arguing for maintaining the status quo understanding of Sony); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S.
186 (2003) (Justice Ginsburg for the majority and Justice Breyer dissenting).
253 See generally Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in
Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1970).
254 Michela Giorcelli & Petra Moser, Copyrights and Creativity: Evidence from Italian
Opera in the Napoleonic Age, 128 J. POL. ECON. 4163, 4165–67 (2020).
250
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thors simply failed to incentivize dead people to produce more saleable creative
products from beyond the grave.
The second commonly proffered explanation for Justice Ginsburg’s proclivity for strong copyrights is that she was influenced by her daughter, Professor Jane Ginsburg’s, expertise in copyright.255 It is not clear from anything she
has written whether or how much Jane Ginsburg may have shaped Justice
Ginsburg’s views about copyright law. Anyone gifted by life with a brilliant
law professor daughter who specialized in copyright law would likely be familiar with her legal scholarship, especially if it were as well regarded and frequently cited as Professor Jane Ginsburg’s is. Though obviously and very openly proud of her daughter, Justice Ginsburg has cited Jane Ginsburg’s legal
scholarship only occasionally in her copyright opinions.256 Amusingly enough,
once when Justice Souter was on the opposite side of a copyright dispute from
Justice Ginsburg, he cited Jane Ginsburg’s work against her in what was perhaps a friendly bit of trolling.257
Both women appear to have been private and circumspect about ways they
may have influenced each other’s legal positions during Justice Ginsburg’s lifetime. It would be fascinating and wonderful to learn the details of any discussions they had about particular copyright cases, or about copyright law generally, if Jane Ginsburg is ever inclined to share these stories in the future.258
Because neither generalization satisfactorily explains the arguably conservative bent of Justice Ginsburg’s copyright jurisprudence, we raise alternative theories. The remainder of the Article identifies several themes running
through her judicial writings on copyright law, and links them to her jurisprudence in other subject areas.

Jess Bravin, Liberal Icon Was a Pioneer in Pursuit of Women’s Rights, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 19–20, 2020, at A6 (“Justice Ginsburg was the court’s most aggressive defender of
copyright, for example, an interest she said she adopted from her daughter, Jane, herself an
expert in intellectual property at Columbia Law School.”); Davis, supra note 29 (“Some
speculate . . . that her views were informed by conversations with her daughter Jane Ginsburg, a Columbia Law School professor who specializes in copyright law.”).
256 Within Justice Ginsburg’s sixteen opinions in copyright law cases, she cites Jane Ginsburg in four. See Star Athletica, LLC v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1018 n.1
(2017) (Ginsburg, J., concurring); Golan, 565 U.S. at 318; Atari I, 888 F.2d 878, 884 n.6
(D.C. Cir. 1989); Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 846 F.2d 1485, 1492–93 (D.C.
Cir. 1988). Because citation counts are not necessarily an accurate measure of influence, we
should not read too much into the citations or lack thereof.
257 See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 928
(2005).
258 The best anecdote Justice Ginsburg told during her Supreme Court nomination speech
was about Jane: “In her high school yearbook on her graduation in 1973, the listing for Jane
Ginsburg under ‘Ambition’ was: ‘To see her mother appointed to the Supreme Court.’ The
next line read: ‘If necessary, Jane will appoint her.’ ” Ruth Bader Ginsburg, U.S. Supreme
Court Justice Nomination Acceptance Address (June 14, 1993), in RUTH BADER GINSBURG
ET AL., MY OWN WORDS 175 (2016).
255
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II. INCREMENTALISM
Justice Ginsburg was an incrementalist. Though she helped reform important laws in a number of dramatic ways, she seemed to prefer instituting radical changes in a methodical manner.259 The first major theme we found in Justice Ginsburg’s copyright jurisprudence is incrementalism, an approach that
informed her positions on many legal subjects.
Justice Ginsburg explicitly identified herself as an incrementalist at her
confirmation hearing for the Supreme Court. In describing how she viewed the
work of judging, she explained:
I would add that the judge should carry out that function without fanfare, but
with due care. She should decide the case before her without reaching out to
cover cases not yet seen. She should be ever mindful, as Judge and then Justice
Benjamin Nathan Cardozo said, “Justice is not to be taken by storm. She is to be
wooed by slow advances.”260

Her concern was that if judges interpreted laws too quickly or reached unnecessary issues, this would create instability and place undue stress on the judiciary.261
Justice Ginsburg’s incremental approach to change was clearly something
that President Clinton valued when he nominated her to the Supreme Court.262
Clinton, too, believed that taking “small incremental steps,” rather than “bold
assertions of judicial power,” was the key to restraining conservatives on the
Court who were striking down progressive legislation.263 He also appreciated
that incrementalism “encouraged justices to focus on the particularities of the
case at hand rather than make sweeping pronouncements that get too far ahead
of elected branches of government and the public in making law.”264
This next Section traces Justice Ginsburg’s use of incrementalism in her
gender equality work as a lawyer, and her critiques of reproductive rights litigation based on a lack of incrementalism.265 It then elucidates the ways incremen-

See Christopher Slobogin, Justice Ginsburg’s Gradualism in Criminal Procedure, 70
OHIO ST. L.J. 867, 867 (2009) (“Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s preference for narrow rulings
that adhere closely to precedent and that avoid grand pronouncements is well-known.”); see
also Jason J. Czarnezki et al., An Empirical Analysis of the Confirmation Hearings of the
Justices of the Rehnquist Natural Court, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 127, 140 tbl.B (2007) (finding that Justice Ginsburg voted to alter precedent in 1.5% of the cases decided between 1994
and 2004, with only Justice Souter demonstrating less willingness to do so at 1.3%).
260 Nomination of Ruth Bader Ginsburg, to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103RD CONG. 51 (1993) [hereinafter Confirmation Hearing] (statement of Hon. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States).
261 GINSBURG ET AL., supra note 258, at 196.
262 JANE SHERRON DE HART, RUTH BADER GINSBURG: A LIFE 307–08 (2018).
263 Id.
264 Id. at 308.
265 See infra Section II.A.
259
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talism played a frequent role in her copyright opinions on the Supreme Court
and D.C. Circuit.266
A. Incrementalism in Gender Equality and Reproductive Rights
Ruth Bader Ginsburg was not a stereotypical radical. Her legacy only
seems radical because she was a pioneer. And she was a successful pioneer
largely because she was not seen as a radical. She made gender equality under
the law seem rational, fair, inevitable, and at times, even banal. Recognizing, as
Martin Luther King, Jr. told us, that “the arc of the moral universe is long, but it
bends toward justice,”267 Justice Ginsburg embraced the concept of incrementalism in her fight for gender equality and adopted it as her preferred method
for advancing reproductive rights.
Ruth Bader Ginsburg used incrementalism as an effective tactic, at a time
when many feminist activists sought fast and dramatic changes.268 Without
overt bomb throwing or public outbursts of anger,269 Justice Ginsburg slowly
and surely convinced people with power that equality under the law was good
for everybody, by serially litigating cases that slowly chipped away at facial
and structural gender inequality.270 She accomplished this by strategically
choosing cases in which men, as well as women, were victims of gender-based
discrimination.271 As one commentator noted, “Crucial to her approach was the
principle that not only rules that discriminate against women, but also ones that
appear to treat women better than men are bad for women, bad for all of us.”272
Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s decision to litigate cases for male plaintiffs harmed by
sexist laws was genius. Everyone wants to be treated fairly. By stealthily but
consistently demonstrating that men also suffered from gender discrimination,
she gave her advocacy an air of credibility within the patriarchy that she could
later leverage, reaping the rewards of her incrementalism. If one sees human
rights as a pie, rights get divided, and when women get more, men have fewer.
Justice Ginsburg characterized human rights differently, more as a public good
See infra Section II.B.
Martin Luther King, Jr., Where Do We Go from Here?, Address at the Annual Convention of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (Aug. 16, 1967), in A CALL TO
CONSCIENCE: THE LANDMARK SPEECHES OF DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 165, 199 (Clayborne Carson & Kris Shepard eds., 2001).
268 Cary Franklin, The Anti-Stereotyping Principle in Constitutional Sex Discrimination
Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 83, 121 (2010).
269 Justice Ginsburg mostly embraced her mother’s advice to “be a lady,” which meant conducting herself civilly and not letting emotions like anger or envy get in her way. GINSBURG
ET AL., supra note 258, at 5.
270 Henry J. Reske, Two Paths for Ginsburg: The Trailblazing Women’s Right Litigator Became a Moderate Judge, 79 A.B.A. J. 16, 18 (1993).
271 Franklin, supra note 268, at 84.
272 Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg: A “Lady” Who Led the Fight for Gender Equity, DUKE L.,
https://web.law.duke.edu/features/2005/ginsburg/ [https://perma.cc/6L9G-V7N4] (quoting
Duke Law School Dean Katharine Bartlett).
266
267
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that did not have to be rationed and was available to everyone. One small step
at a time, Justice Ginsburg convinced the powerful that the pie could be made
larger, big enough to serve gender equality to everyone who was hungry for
it.273
Justice Ginsburg realized while she was still a litigating attorney that maximizing success required not only the optimal party as plaintiff, but also selecting the right cases in the right order.274 She chose her battles carefully, because
the cases she proceeded with needed “to be specific and narrowly defined, yet
incrementally more demanding, so as to [move the Supreme Court towards using strict scrutiny in gender equality cases].”275 Early on in her legal activism,
Justice Ginsburg benefited when then-Solicitor General Erwin Griswold, in a
petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court, used the Department of Defense
computer system to generate a list of federal statutes that differentiated between
men and women, and he attached this as an appendix to his petition.276 This fortuitous appendix provided a roadmap that helped Ginsburg determine which
cases would best facilitate her incremental strengthening of gender equality.277
Justice Ginsburg’s incrementalist approach to gender equality began when
she was a practicing lawyer in the 1960s and 1970s, and was inspired by the
civil rights movement.278 Thurgood Marshall and the NAACP adroitly curated
cases to challenge Jim Crow laws and developed a strategy of establishing
small victories that would serve as precedents for more difficult future cases.279
This series of victories eventually culminated in Brown v. Board of Education,
which finally recognized that “separate but equal” was unlawful.280 Although
Justice Ginsburg faced different challenges in her fight for gender equality, she
followed the civil rights movement’s incrementalist path to success, which
suited her temperament and ultimately helped her win critical victories.
But it was also her incrementalism that caused her to be surprisingly critical of judicial efforts to protect reproductive rights, particularly Roe v. Wade,
the landmark 1973 Supreme Court decision establishing a constitutional right to
abortion.281 The legality of abortion is a politically divisive issue, to make an
Franklin, supra note 268, at 92–96 (describing John Stuart Mill’s explanation of how
gender inequality harms both women and men and noting that Justice Ginsburg relied on
Mill in developing her litigation campaign).
274 DE HART, supra note 262, at 173.
275 Id.
276 Id. at 172.
277 Id.; Interview Transcript, supra note 9, at 816.
278 DE HART, supra note 262, at 170 (“[S]he would rely on the example set by [Thurgood]
Marshall, whose efforts ‘inspired.’ ”).
279 Id.
280 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (“We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place.”).
281 See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sex Equality and the Constitution, 52 TUL. L. REV. 451, 460–
61 (1978) [hereinafter Ginsburg, Sex Equality]; Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on
Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375, 379–83 (1985)
273
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obvious point. Ruth Bader Ginsburg understood firsthand the importance of reproductive freedom to women. She was demoted at her job during her first
pregnancy expressly for being pregnant, and at the time, this demotion was perfectly legal.282 She hid her second pregnancy under baggy clothes because she
was afraid she would be fired for it.283 Yet from Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s memoir, My Own Words, one learns that Justice Ginsburg was not really fond of Roe
v. Wade because she did not like how it was structured.284 She felt the ruling
tried to do too much, too fast, which would lead to doctrinal instability.285
In 1992, Ginsburg articulated her concerns about Roe v. Wade as follows:
The seven to two judgment in Roe v. Wade declared “violative of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment” a Texas criminal abortion statute
that intolerably shackled a woman’s autonomy; the Texas law “except[ed] from
criminality only a life-saving procedure on behalf of the [pregnant woman].”
Suppose the Court had stopped there, rightly declaring unconstitutional the most
extreme brand of law in the nation, and had not gone on, as the Court did in Roe,
to fashion a regime blanketing the subject, a set of rules that displaced virtually
every state law then in force. Would there have been the twenty-year controversy we have witnessed, reflected most recently in the Supreme Court’s splintered
decision in Planned Parenthood v. Casey? A less encompassing Roe, one that
merely struck down the extreme Texas law and went no further on that day, I believe and will summarize why, might have served to reduce rather than to fuel
controversy.286

This and her earlier, similar critiques of Roe led some feminist activists to
be initially skeptical of President Bill Clinton’s nomination of Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg to the Supreme Court.287 But they were persuaded of her com[hereinafter Ginsburg, Some Thoughts]; Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice,
67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185, 1199–1206 (1992) [hereinafter Ginsburg, Judicial Voice].
282 Siegel, Pregnant Citizen, supra note 1, at 182 (“I told the head of the office when I started that I was 3-months pregnant. He said, ‘Well, we can’t place you as a GS-5 because you
won’t be able to go to Baltimore for training. So, we will list you as a GS-2 and you’ll do the
work of a GS-5.’ ”); see also DE HART, supra note 262, at 93 (same).
283 DE HART, supra note 262, at 93 (“Until the renewed contract was in hand, she would disguise her expanding figure in oversize clothes borrowed from her mother-in-law. And she
certainly would not tell her colleagues that she was expecting.”); Interview Transcript, supra
note 9, at 807.
284 GINSBURG ET AL., supra note 258, at 239; see also Alisha Haridasani Gupta, Why Ruth
Bader Ginsburg Wasn’t All That Fond of Roe v. Wade, N.Y. TIMES (May 19, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/21/us/ruth-bader-ginsburg-roe-v-wade.html [perma.cc/Q3
37-9UY3].
285
GINSBURG ET. AL., supra note 258, at 239.
286 Ginsburg, Judicial Voice, supra note 281, at 1199 (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted).
287 DE HART, supra note 262, at 310; see also Olivia B. Waxman, Ruth Bader Ginsburg
Wishes This Case Had Legalized Abortion Instead of Roe v. Wade, TIME (Aug. 2, 2018,
11:00 AM), https://time.com/5354490/ruth-bader-ginsburg-roe-v-wade/ [perma.cc/N9DXWJY2]; Gupta, supra note 284. In 1992, long after Justice Ginsburg became a judge on the
D.C. Circuit and ceased working as an attorney, in-house ACLU lawyers involved with reproductive freedom issues left the ACLU to form the Center for Reproductive Rights. The
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mitment to reproductive freedom in part when she explained that she thought
protection of the right to abortion should have been based on the reasoning that
restricting abortion impeded gender equality.288 She thought this was a better
legal foundation than Roe v. Wade’s right to privacy.289 She definitely embraced the rights of women to control their own bodies wholeheartedly.
Is there merit in Justice Ginsburg’s critique of Roe v. Wade? That is hard to
say. One might fairly say of Roe that the Supreme Court majority decided to act
first and apologize later, rather than to ask permission. There was certainly
nothing incremental about that opinion. The speed at which Roe v. Wade created nationwide access to abortions could not have been matched by an incremental approach. It is not even clear that nationwide access would have occurred at all without such a sweeping opinion from the Supreme Court. At least
during the pendency of what Justice Ginsburg described in 1992 as “the twenty-year controversy we have witnessed, reflected most recently in the Supreme
Court’s splintered decision in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,”290 legal abortions
were available in every state, and still are, though perhaps not for much longer.291
reasons for the organizational split are not completely clear, but one gets a sense that a culture of incrementalism may have been part of the problem. In 1992, many believed that Roe
v. Wade would be overturned imminently. People invested in reproductive rights litigation
wanted to gear up quickly to take the abortion rights battle state by state. The ACLU remained active in reproductive rights litigation through its Reproductive Freedom Project and
now often coordinates activities with those of the Center for Reproductive Justice. See David
Margolick, Seeking Strength in Independence, Abortion-Rights Unit Quits A.C.L.U., N.Y.
TIMES (May 21, 1992), https://www.nytimes.com/1992/05/21/us/seeking-strength-in-indepen
dence-abortion-rights-unit-quits-aclu.html [https://perma.cc/8EFK-84BK].
288 Gupta, supra note 284; Meredith Heagney, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg Offers Critique
of Roe v. Wade During Law School Visit, UNIV. CHI. L. SCH. (May 15, 2013),
https://www.law.uchicago.edu/news/justice-ruth-bader-ginsburg-offers-critique-roe-v-wadeduring-law-school-visit [https://perma.cc/U5LJ-XVUQ].
289 Ginsburg, Judicial Voice, supra note 281, at 1200; see also Ginsburg, Sex Equality, supra note 281, at 460; Gupta, supra note 284.
290 Ginsburg, Judicial Voice, supra note 281, at 1199.
291 Abortion rights cases continued to arrive at the Supreme Court, reflecting staunch persistence on the parts of those who would illegalize abortion. Recognizing that it was not the
time for incrementalism, Justice Ginsburg strongly dissented from the five-Justice majority
in Gonzales v. Carhart in 2007, also displaying a rhetoric flash of anger. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 169–91 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). It was the first time the Supreme Court upheld a law restricting a method of abortion that did not offer an exception
that would safeguard not only a woman’s existence—her life—but her health as well. Id. at
171–72. She described the majority opinion as an alarming decision that “tolerates, indeed
applauds, federal intervention to ban nationwide a procedure found necessary and proper in
certain cases by the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists” and for the first
time “blesses a prohibition with no exception safeguarding a woman’s health.” Id. at 171.
After Justice Ginsburg’s death and her fast replacement by Amy Coney Barrett, it has
become very likely that Roe v. Wade will be overturned soon. If that occurs, we will see if
there are adequate legal methods, incremental or otherwise, to preserve or restore access to
safe and legal abortions. When Barack Obama first ran for President, he said that if he were
elected, one of the first things he would do was work with Congress to get the Freedom of
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Professor Mary Hartnett, who coauthored Justice Ginsburg’s autobiography, asserted that
[i]n a way, Justice Ginsburg’s opinion on Roe perfectly encapsulates how she
functioned. She was passionate about equality for women, L.G.B.T.Q. people
and minority groups, and fiercely devoted to human dignity and respect . . . . But
she was also deeply thoughtful and measured on how to bring those conditions
about, and her decisions—shaped by nuanced legal reasoning—sometimes ran
counter to what many of her fans might have expected.292

Whether a slower phase-in of nationwide abortion rights or grounding reproductive freedom in an alternative legal theory such as gender equality would
have created less social and political conflict is ultimately unknowable.293 But
Justice Ginsburg’s incrementalism remained extant throughout her judicial career and across subject areas. For example, Justice Ginsburg was passionately

Choice Act passed to protect nationwide access to legal abortions. Will Evans, When
Speeches Come Back to Haunt, NPR: SECRET MONEY PROJECT (Oct. 16, 2008, 5:01 PM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/secretmoney/2008/10/family_research_council.html
[https://perma.cc/8XGK-QMGB]. He never executed on that promise, and it seems unlikely
that President Biden will make passage of such a controversial law a priority given his ambitions of bringing more unity to the nation. Unlike Ledbetter, the conflict is unlikely to be resolved with the passage of a new law. The fate of abortion access clearly lies with the courts
of the nation, both federal and state. If Roe v. Wade is overturned, a majority of states are
likely to prohibit abortions immediately. When activist feminist lawyers attempt to restore
national access to abortion, they will have to choose between Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s preferred incremental approach and more radical options.
But even if Roe remains intact, access to abortion in many parts of the United States is
already extremely limited. Over eleven million women of reproductive age in the United
States live more than an hour’s drive from an abortion facility. See K.K. Rebecca Lai & Jugal K. Patel, For Millions of American Women, Abortion Access is Out of Reach, N.Y. TIMES
(May 31, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/05/31/us/abortion-clinicsmap.html [https://perma.cc/AVK9-9AVP]. Missouri is likely to become the first state that
does not host any clinics that perform abortions at all, if it is not already. See Sarah
McCammon, As Missouri Clinic Awaits Its Legal Fate, Abortions in State Have Virtually
Halted, NPR (Mar. 12, 2020, 6:03 AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/03/12/814768754/asmissouri-clinic-awaits-its-legal-fate-abortions-in-state-have-virtually-halte
[https://perma.cc/YCK3-KQRD]. Eight states—Arkansas, Alabama, Iowa, Louisiana, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Texas—have tried to stop abortions altogether during the pandemic “by classifying it as an elective procedure and citing the need to conserve personal
protective equipment for healthcare workers treating COVID-19 patients.” Pavithra Mohan,
For Many Women, Abortion Access Was Already Limited. Then COVID-19 Hit, FAST
COMPANY (Apr. 28, 2020), https://www.fastcompany.com/90496986/for-many-womenabortion-access-was-already-limited-then-covid-19-hit
[https://perma.cc/UU5S-3UMT].
Challenges to abortion rights tend to be both dramatic and opportunistic, but not at all incremental.
292 Gupta, supra note 284.
293 In fact, Justice Ginsburg herself expressed some skepticism. See Ginsburg, Some
Thoughts, supra note 281, at 383 (“I do not pretend that, if the Court had added a distinct sex
discrimination theme to its medically oriented opinion, the storm Roe generated would have
been less furious.”).
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in favor of the Equal Rights Amendment.294 Getting a constitutional amendment passed is the epitome of incrementalism; these do not happen overnight,
to put it lightly.
At her Supreme Court confirmation hearings, Ruth Bader Ginsburg stated,
“I remain an advocate of the Equal Rights Amendment for this reason. I have a
daughter and a granddaughter.”295 She believed that passage could happen
eventually, even if it took a long time. Justice Ginsburg has described herself as
standing on the shoulders of people who “kept dreams of equal citizenship alive
in days when few would listen,” such as Susan B. Anthony, Elizabeth Cady
Stanton, and Harriet Tubman.296 Many women now stand on Justice Ginsburg’s
deceptively fragile looking shoulders made of steel, hoping to continue her
progress, perhaps in an equally incremental manner.
B. Incrementalism and Copyright Law
Justice Ginsburg’s incrementalistic tendencies are observable throughout
her copyright law jurisprudence, but are more subtle than in the equal rights
and reproductive rights cases.297 These instances of incrementalism arise in
several cases in big and small ways, but reflect her consistent cautiousness and

Confirmation Hearing, supra note 260, at 189–90. In 1973, she published an article
about the ERA that, in pertinent part, reassured readers that after it was passed, restrooms in
public places could still be “sex separated.” Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Need for the Equal
Rights Amendment, 59 A.B.A. J. 1013, 1018 (1973). She noted that ERA proponents were
curious about whether the actual concern was that men would want to use the women’s restrooms, or that women would want to use the men’s restrooms and suggested single-stall
restrooms would be a creative solution. Id. Though most of us make the bathrooms in our
homes available to all genders, conflicts around gendered public restrooms persist to this
day. Most recent ones involve the attempted exclusion of transgendered or nonbinary people.
Emanuella Grinberg & Dani Stewart, 3 Myths That Shape the Transgender Bathroom Debate, CNN (Mar. 7, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/03/07/health/transgender-bathroomlaw-facts-myths/index.html [https://perma.cc/9QSP-7SL2]. And almost fifty years later, Justice Ginsburg’s proposed solution is still an excellent one: all-gender single-stall bathrooms.
Everyone is welcome to use them, and everybody gets privacy. This approach is also slowly
catching on.
295 Confirmation Hearing, supra note 260, at 190.
296 Id. at 50.
297 One reason (if not the primary reason) for Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s incremental approach
in gender equality litigation was that she was trying to change long-held social norms and
make this change more palatable to the nine men on the Supreme Court, so they would eventually declare that these traditional views of gender roles were inaccurate and unfair. The
same was true for racial justice during the Civil Rights Movement. However, copyright law
does not have a similar long-held social norm that unfairly prejudices one side of copyright
disputes. Although it seems clear that an incremental approach was necessary for effective
gender equality litigation, it’s not clear that such an approach is necessary in the copyright
context. This is not to say that Justice Ginsburg was just blindly following her well-paved
gender equality approach. Although not driven by cultural attitudes and bias, her preference
for incrementalism was likely driven by her belief in intergovernmental dialogue. See infra
Part III.
294
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restraint in interpreting the law.298 The next Sections address three variations of
Justice Ginsburg’s incrementalism: (1) writing narrow opinions that slowly
move the law in her desired direction; (2) recognizing, but not precipitously deciding, extraneous legal issues for which she planted analytical seeds for the
future; and (3) reinterpreting precedent.
1. Limited Holdings and Accretion
Justice Ginsburg’s cautious incrementalism is visible within three linked
copyright cases that can be called the “First Sale Doctrine Abroad Trilogy.”
The three relevant cases, in chronological order, are Quality King Distributors,
Inc. v. L’anza Research International, Inc.,299 Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Omega, S.A.,300 and Kirtsaeng I.301
The first sale doctrine is articulated in § 109 of the Copyright Act. It plays
an important role in United States copyright law by limiting the rights of an intellectual property owner to control resale of products embodying its intellectual property. Under the first sale doctrine, an individual who purchases a copy of
a copyrighted work from the copyright holder receives the right to sell, display,
or otherwise dispose of that particular physical copy any way they choose,
notwithstanding the interests or preferences of the copyright owner.302 Owners
can bend, fold, spindle, or mutilate their copies; they just cannot copy them.
The first sale doctrine does not allow reproductions.

Notwithstanding the overwhelming evidence of Justice Ginsburg’s incrementalism, there
is at least one incident where she clearly questioned the wisdom of an incremental approach.
Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 997 (2020), was a case involving whether Congress could
waive a state’s sovereign immunity for copyright infringement claims. The Court in a previous case, Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996), held that Congress could not
use its Article I powers to circumvent state sovereign immunity. Following Seminole Tribe,
the Court in Central Virginia Community College v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 356 (2006), held
that Congress could rely on its Article I powers in bankruptcy to strip state sovereign immunity. A question in Allen was whether the Court needed to address each specific Article I
power to determine whether Congress could abrogate sovereign immunity or whether Seminole Tribe was the general rule and Katz a mere exception thereto. During oral argument in
Allen, Justice Ginsburg asked counsel:
298

[I]n Katz, the—the Court concentrated on the bankruptcy authority as a unique authority. We
have Seminole, which is across the board, and then we have the exception for the Bankruptcy
Clause. Now are you asking us to go through all of the Article III [sic] authority and take them
one by one? Isn’t Katz more properly read as a bankruptcy exception to the Seminole Tribe rule?

Transcript of Oral Argument at 6, Allen, 140 S. Ct 994 (No. 18-877). One would expect Justice Ginsburg, with her focus on incrementalism, to prefer a limited power-by-power approach rather than a blanket rule covering numerous powers not yet exercised by Congress
or addressed by the Supreme Court.
299 Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L’anza Rsch. Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135 (1998).
300 Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Omega, S.A., 562 U.S. 40 (2010).
301 Kirtsaeng I, 568 U.S. 519 (2013).
302 17 U.S.C. § 109(a).
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Content owners dislike the first sale doctrine because it generally allows
purchasers to lend, rent, or resell their copies,303 with limited exceptions for
phonorecords and computer software.304 As a result, it interferes with copyright
holders’ ability to prevent arbitrage.305 Without the first sale doctrine, the copyright owner could segment the market by charging a higher price for copies in
the United States and lower prices in foreign markets without fear that the lower-priced foreign copies would make their way into the United States and directly compete with the higher priced domestic copies. But until the conclusion
of the trilogy, it was unclear whether the first sale doctrine allowed the importation of lawfully produced copyrighted goods without the copyright holder’s
permission.
The trilogy addressed one fundamental question three times: Do lawfully
made objects suddenly infringe when they cross national boundaries? The first
case in the trilogy, Quality King v. L’anza, was a dispute about the labels on
shampoo bottles.306 The plaintiff was a company that manufactured “luxury”
shampoo in the United States, and sold it domestically at premium prices.307 It
also sold the shampoo abroad at much lower prices.308 The defendant distributor noticed and began purchasing the shampoo abroad at the lower prices and
bringing cases of it back to the United States to sell.309 To try to stop this, the
plaintiff sued the defendant for copyright infringement and obtained an injunction to prevent the continued importation of its shampoo by the defendant.310
Shampoo itself cannot be copyrighted, but the decorative features on the outside of the bottle were copyrightable.311 The defendants did not copy, and were
not accused of copying, the shampoo bottle labels, or illicitly copying anything
at all.312 Just the act of bringing the original, unmodified shampoo bottles back
into the United States from abroad without the copyright holder’s permission
was alleged to infringe the plaintiff’s copyrights in the copyrightable elements
of the shampoo labels under § 602(a) of the Copyright Act.313 The plaintiff
L’anza claimed that when properly construed, § 602(a) prohibited foreign disId.
Id. § 109(b); see also Ryan Vacca, Expanding Preferential Treatment Under the Record
Rental Amendment Beyond the Music Industry, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 605, 612–16
(2007) (explaining the history of the exception to the first sale doctrine for phonorecords and
software).
305 Lorie M. Graham & Stephen M. McJohn, Intellectual Property’s First Sale Doctrine and
the Policy Against Restraints on Alienation, 7 TEX. A&M L. REV. 497, 511 (2020).
306 Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L’anza Rsch. Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 138 (1998).
307 Id. at 138–39.
308 Id. at 139.
309 Id.
310
L’anza Rsch. Int’l, Inc. v. Quality King, No. CV–94–00841, 1995 WL 908331, at *4
(C.D. Cal. July 7, 1995).
311 Quality King, 523 U.S. at 140.
312 Id.
313 Id. at 139–40.
303
304
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tributors from reselling its products to American vendors who were unable to
buy from its domestic distributors.314 The case turned on how the Court resolved the conflicts between the importation restrictions of § 602(a) and the
first sale doctrine. The Court decided that the relevant statutory language
demonstrated that the right granted by § 602(a) was subject to § 109(a).315
In her concurrence, Justice Ginsburg, ever the incrementalist, wrote: “This
case involves a ‘round trip’ journey, travel of the copies in question from the
United States to places abroad, then back again. I join the Court’s opinion recognizing that we do not today resolve cases in which the allegedly infringing
imports were manufactured abroad.”316 Because L’anza had manufactured the
shampoo bottles in the United States and then sent them abroad, they were
“lawfully made under this title” as required by § 109(a).317 She explicitly withheld judgment about whether a copy produced abroad was equally protected by
the first sale doctrine.318
It was not long before the identical issue arose for “one way” goods. In
Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Omega, the dispute arose because Costco sold
watches in the United States that were manufactured in Switzerland by Omega,
having imported and sold them without Omega’s authorization.319 Omega sued
Costco for copyright infringement under § 602(a).320 Again, nothing had been
copied. Only the distribution right, in the context of international trade, was
implicated.321 But Omega had a registered copyright in a tiny design element
duly imprinted on its watches, and believed this provided a vector of control
over unauthorized importations.322 Costco argued that the first sale doctrine applied to lawfully made foreign-manufactured goods as well as domestic ones,
superseding § 602(a).323 The Supreme Court split four to four over this question
because Justice Kagan recused herself due to prior involvement with the case
while she was Solicitor General, before she joined the Court.324 So there was no
resolution to the issue of the first sale doctrine’s impact on § 602(a) when
goods were lawfully made abroad rather than in the United States. As is typically done with ties, the Court did not release the names of the Justices on ei-

Id. at 143.
Id. at 143–45.
316 Id. at 154 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
317 Id.
318 Id.
319 Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 541 F.3d 982, 983–84 (9th Cir. 2008).
320 Id. at 984.
321 Id. at 983–84.
322 Id. at 983.
323 Id. at 984.
324 Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Omega, S.A., 562 U.S. 40 (2010); Eric Engleman, Supreme
Court Split on Costco-Omega Case, PUGET SOUND BUS. J. (Dec. 13, 2010, 11:26 AM),
https://www.bizjournals.com/seattle/blog/2010/12/supreme-court-split-on-costco-omegacase.html [https://perma.cc/J64R-BL3N].
314
315
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ther side of the evenly divided split.325 But based on her concurrence in Quality
King and her eventual dissent in Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, it seems very
likely that Justice Ginsburg would have favored Omega’s position in the dispute.
The third and final trilogy case was Kirtsaeng I. Unlike a shampoo bottle
or tiny design element on a watch, the subject matter of the dispute was textbooks, literary works that sit squarely within the zone of what copyright law is
intended to incentivize and protect.326 Kirtsaeng was an enterprising foreign
graduate student studying in the United States.327 After realizing that textbooks
cost significantly more money in the United States than the virtually identical
books did in Thailand, he encouraged his friends and family to send him lawfully made textbooks from Thailand to sell.328 The textbooks were purchased at
substantially lower prices in Thailand, and even after covering shipping costs,
Kirtsaeng could make money by reselling these books more cheaply than textbook vendors in the United States.329 He was eventually sued for copyright infringement by book publishers.330 Once again, no unauthorized copies had been
made. The publishers accused Kirtsaeng of violating their § 602(a) importation
rights.331 He asserted the first sale doctrine in defense and prevailed by a 6–3
vote.332 Justice Breyer, writing for the majority, concluded that the first sale
doctrine, which allows the owners of copyrighted works to sell or otherwise
dispose of their copies as they wish, applies to copyrighted works lawfully
made abroad as well as domestically.333
It is probably no surprise to learn that Justice Ginsburg dissented.334 She
was joined in her dissent fully by Justice Kennedy and in part by Justice Scalia.335 She railed against enemies of incrementalism, and her words were blistering:
Instead of adhering to the Legislature’s design, the Court today adopts an interpretation of the Copyright Act at odds with Congress’ aim to protect copyright
325

Justin Pidot, Tie Votes in the Supreme Court, 101 MINN. L. REV. 245, 254 (2016) (“Typically, the Court also avoids identifying who among the Justices cast which votes, because
this cloak of anonymity ‘may well enable the next case presenting [a legal issue] to be approached with less commitment.’ At times, however, the Court has diverged from this practice and identified precisely how the votes broke down in a particular case. At other times,
particular Justices have written at length about their views of the lower court’s opinion notwithstanding the fact that a tie vote has disabled the Supreme Court from resolving the case.”
(citations omitted)).
326 Kirtsaeng I, 568 U.S. 519, 525–27 (2013).
327 Id. at 527.
328 Id.
329 Id.
330 Id.
331 Id.
332 Id. at 554.
333 Id. at 525.
334 Id. at 557 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
335 Id.
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owners against the unauthorized importation of low-priced, foreign-made copies
of their copyrighted works. The Court’s bold departure from Congress’ design is
all the more stunning, for it places the United States at the vanguard of the
movement for “international exhaustion” of copyrights—a movement the United
States has steadfastly resisted on the world stage.336

Justice Ginsburg asserted that “[s]ection 109(a), properly read, afford[ed]
Kirtsaeng no defense against Wiley’s claim of copyright infringement.”337 The
Copyright Act, she claimed, did not apply extraterritorially.338 While her entire
dissent was fierce, what she claimed to be arguing for was no change at all in
how the relevant portions of the Copyright Act were interpreted. As an incrementalist, she saw the majority’s approach as modifying copyright law too
quickly—moving the United States from a staunch opponent of international
exhaustion for several decades339 to “solidly in the international-exhaustion
camp.”340
Another instance of Justice Ginsburg’s incrementalist restraint in the judicial law-making process was her concurrence in Varsity Brands v. Star Athletica.341 Her approach in Star Athletica bears substantial similarity to her concurrence in Quality King. This case involved copyright protection for cheerleading
uniforms.342 The plaintiffs had copyright registrations for two-dimensional designs consisting of lines, chevrons, and colorful shapes, which appeared on
cheerleading uniforms that they designed, made, and sold.343 They sued a competitor for infringing these copyrights, and the competitor challenged the validity of their copyrights.344
The legal issue in Star Athletica was how to determine whether the design
of a useful article “can be identified separately from, and [is] capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.”345 The relevant legal
analysis, articulated within the Copyright Act, is known as the separability doctrine.346 The separability doctrine channels intellectual property protections in
Id.
Id. at 562.
338 Id.
339 Id. at 576 (“[T]he United States has steadfastly ‘taken the position in international trade
negotiations that domestic copyright owners should . . . have the right to prevent the unauthorized importation of copies of their work sold abroad.’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae, Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L’anza Research
Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135 (1998) (No. 96-1470))).
340 Id. at 575. As described infra Section III.A, her dissent also fits within her jurisprudential
theme of intergovernmental dialogue.
341 Star Athletica, LLC v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1018–19 (2017) (Ginsburg,
J., concurring).
342 Id. at 1007 (majority opinion).
343 Id.
344 Id. at 1007–08.
345 Id. at 1007 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101).
346 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works” to include “twodimensional and three-dimensional works of fine, graphic, and [other types of] applied art”
336
337
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useful articles toward patents, and away from copyright law, which is doctrinally forbidden from facilitating the monopolization of purely utilitarian goods, or
of the functional aspects of pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works.347 Only
when the useful aspects of creative designs are separable is the design entitled
to copyright protection.348 But the precise method of determining separability
involved confusing and irreconcilable inter- and intra-circuit splits.349
The Supreme Court concluded that a feature incorporated into the “design
of a useful article is eligible for copyright protection if the feature (1) can be
perceived as a two- or three-dimensional work of art separate from the useful
article and (2) would qualify as a protectable pictorial, graphic, or sculptural
work . . . if imagined separately from the useful article.”350 In setting out its
own two-part test, the Court rejected all of the previously proffered tests for determining separability.351 This test has been criticized on multiple grounds, including that it “fundamentally altered the nature of copyright law’s functionality screen,”352 “charted an entirely new path through copyright law,”353 failed to
clarify how copyright law treats functionality,354 “produce[d] uncertainty for
creators litigants, and judges,”355 and did not undertake the important first step
of identifying whether the articles in question—here, several cheerleading uniforms—were useful articles.356 As many law professors are painfully aware, the
majority opinion is so confusingly written that it is extremely difficult to teach.
and considering the design of a useful article to be “a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work
only if, and only to the extent that, such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural
features that can be identified separately from, and are capable of existing independently of,
the utilitarian aspects of the article”); see also Sanja Wolf Sahlsten, Note, I’m a Little Treepot: Conceptual Separability and Affording Copyright Protection to Useful Articles, 67 FLA.
L. REV. 941, 941 (2016) (“To determine if a useful article—generally ineligible for copyright
protection—has pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that are copyrightable, the Copyright Act and the legislative intent expressed through the Act’s legislative history require that
those artistic features be identified separately and capable of existing independently of the
utilitarian function of the work.”).
347 Christopher Buccafusco et al., Intelligent Design, 68 DUKE L.J. 75, 98, 105, 109 (2018);
Peter S. Menell & Daniel Yablon, Star Athletica’s Fissure in the Intellectual Property Functionality Landscape, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 137, 139 (2017).
348 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works”).
349 Menell & Yablon, supra note 347, at 139; Tyler T. Ochoa, What Is a “Useful Article” in
Copyright Law After Star Athletica?, 166 U. PA. L. REV.105, 105 (2017) (“The Supreme
Court likely granted certiorari because the Sixth Circuit identified no fewer than nine different tests that courts and commentators had proposed for resolving the issue, and the Sixth
Circuit adopted a tenth.”).
350 Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1016.
351 Id. at 1013–15; Ochoa, supra note 349, at 105–06.
352 Buccafusco et al., supra note 347, at 111.
353 Christopher Buccafusco & Jeanne C. Fromer, Fashion’s Function in Intellectual Property Law, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 51, 85 (2017).
354 Christopher Buccafusco & Jeanne C. Fromer, Forgetting Functionality, 166 U. PA. L.
REV. 119, 119 (2017).
355 Id.
356 Ochoa, supra note 349, at 106.
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Justice Ginsburg’s approach to determining whether an object was a useful
article illustrates her abiding incrementalism, even when abject clarity would
be very helpful to stakeholders. In her concurring opinion, she wrote that she
would not take up the separability test in this case “because the designs at issue
are not designs of useful articles,” but “copyrightable pictorial or graphic works
reproduced on useful articles.”357 In drawing the “of” versus “on” distinction,
Justice Ginsburg declaimed that there was no need to address the thorny separability question and that doing so with these facts only complicated the issue.358 Unfortunately, addressing the separability test as articulated in Star Athletica with almost any facts greatly complicates the issue because the Star
Athletica approach is extremely obtuse. Justice Ginsburg noted in the context of
reproductive rights that “[d]octrinal limbs too swiftly shaped, experience teaches, may prove unstable.”359 Perhaps she did not recognize how radically Star
Athletica would impact the scope of copyrightability in pictorial, graphic, and
sculptural works, and in such a destabilizing fashion. As one observer trenchantly noted, “the opinion may not eliminate lower courts’ variations in separability analysis because it contradicts itself regarding the inherent separability of
surface designs, does little more than restate the statute, and flinches from delving into the visual nature of the question.”360 It is a perilously difficult case to
interpret, and therefore it is impossible not to feel sympathy for lawyers who
must litigate cases involving the separability doctrine.361
Star Athletica, LLC v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1018 (2017) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring). Interestingly, after certiorari was granted, but before the case was heard, Jane
Ginsburg published an article noting that Star Athletica was a poor vehicle for addressing
separability because the cheerleading outfits did not involve the design of a useful article.
Jane C. Ginsburg, “Courts Have Twisted Themselves into Knots”: U.S. Copyright Protection
for Applied Art, 40 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1, 1 (2016).
358 Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1018 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); see Buccafusco & Fromer,
supra note 354, at 119 (“[T]he U.S. Supreme Court had an opportunity to clarify copyright
law’s treatment of product designs that incorporate functionality. Its opinion failed to do so
in a host of different ways.”); see also Martin Tartre, Useful or Useless?: A Modern Perspective on the Protectability of Useful Articles in Domestic & Foreign Copyright Law, 45
AIPLA Q.J. 467, 489–90 (2017) (“[T]he test remains complicated and offers little certainty
to designers and artists who might wish to engage in commercialization of their artwork.”).
359 Ginsburg, Judicial Voice, supra note 281, at 1198.
360 Copyright Act of 1976—Useful Articles—Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc.,
131 HARV. L. REV. 363, 363 (2017).
361 Incrementalism was also on display in the majority opinion in Aereo, which Justice
Ginsburg joined. Aereo and many amici expressed concern that if Aereo’s conduct counted
as an infringing public performance, then such liability would also extend to similar and future technologies such as cloud computing, remote storage DVR, and the like. Am. Broad.
Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 573 U.S. 431, 449–51 (2014). The Court explained that it agreed with
the Solicitor General that such questions were not before the Court and “should await a case
in which they are squarely presented.” Id. at 450–51. Instead, the Court declared that its
holding was limited and would not discourage the emergence or use of other technologies.
Id. at 449.
It is also worth noting that Justice Ginsburg did not always adhere to incrementalism in copyright cases. In Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340 (1998), which
357
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2. Acknowledgement, Refusal, and Seed Planting
Justice Ginsburg’s incrementalism also surfaced, though in more minor
ways, in several copyright opinions while she served on the Supreme Court and
the D.C. Circuit Court. In these cases, she acknowledged unresolved questions
that accompanied the specific issues being litigated, but she declined to resolve
those extra issues. Instead, she noted the extra issues and left them for future
clarification. This type of incrementalism is observable in four of her copyright
opinions.
First, in Petrella, a case involving whether laches was available as a defense to damages for copyright infringement, Justice Ginsburg explained that a
copyright claim accrues when an infringing act occurs.362 And in a footnote she
stated:
Although we have not passed on the question, nine Courts of Appeals have
adopted, as an alternative to the incident of injury rule, a “discovery rule,” which
starts the limitations period when “the plaintiff discovers, or with due diligence
should have discovered, the injury that forms the basis for the claim.” 363

By refusing to decide the propriety of the discovery rule, she left the issue
to percolate in the lower courts so the Supreme Court could address it later, in
due course.364
concerned whether a party is entitled to a jury trial on the amount of statutory damages, Justice Ginsburg joined Justice Thomas’s majority opinion holding that the Copyright Act does
not provide for a jury trial, but the Seventh Amendment does. Id. at 340–42. Interestingly,
Justice Scalia wrote a concurring opinion where he opined that the Copyright Act’s language
on statutory damages could be interpreted to provide a jury trial and because of this, the
Court should have avoided the constitutional question and left it for another day. Id. at 355–
59 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Ginsburg did not join Justice Scalia’s concurrence despite
its strong incremental approach. Id.
362 Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 572 U.S. 663, 670 (2014).
363 Id. at 670 n.4 (quoting William A. Graham Co. v. Haughey, 568 F.3d 425, 433 (3d Cir.
2009)).
364 Most of the lower courts addressing whether Petrella abrogates the discovery rule have
held that the discovery rule survives. See Design Basics, LLC v. Quality Crafted Homes Inc.,
No. 16-CV-50, 2017 WL 1301465, at *2–3 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 7, 2017); Design Basics, LLC v.
Lancia Homes, Inc., No. 16-CV-47, 2017 WL 228196, at *2–3 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 19, 2017);
Boehm v. Heyrman Printing, LLC, No. 16-CV-305, 2017 WL 53296, at *1–2 (W.D. Wis.
Jan. 4, 2017); Design Basics, LLC v. Best Built, Inc., 223 F. Supp. 3d 825, 836 (E.D. Wis.
2016); Seide v. Level-(1) Global Sols., LLC, No. 16 C 2975, 2016 WL 4206076, at *3 (N.D.
Ill. Aug. 10, 2016); Energy Intel. Grp., Inc. v. Kayne Anderson Cap. Advisors, LP, No. H14-1903, 2016 WL 1203763, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 22, 2016); Wolf v. Travolta, 167 F.
Supp. 3d 1077, 1092–93 (C.D. Cal. 2016); Design Basics, LLC v. Carhart Lumber Co., No.
13CV125, 2016 WL 424974, at *3 (D. Neb. Feb. 3, 2016); Design Basics, LLC v. J & V
Roberts Invs., Inc., 130 F. Supp. 3d 1266, 1281–82 (E.D. Wis. 2015); Design Basics, LLC v.
Campbellsport Bldg. Supply Inc., 99 F. Supp. 3d 899, 919 (E.D. Wis. 2015); Wu v. John
Wiley & Sons, Inc., No. 14 Civ. 6746, 2015 WL 5254885, at *4 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10,
2015); Oracle USA, Inc. v. Rimini St. Inc., No. 10-CV-00106, 2015 WL 5089779, at *6 (D.
Nev. Aug. 27, 2015); Panoramic Stock Images, Ltd. v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., No. 12 C
10003, 2014 WL 4344095, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 2, 2014); Frerck v. Pearson Educ., Inc., 63
F. Supp. 3d 882, 887 n.3 (N.D. Ill. 2014); Beasley v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 56 F. Supp.
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Second, in New York Times Co. v. Tasini,365 a case deciding whether
§ 201(c) of the Copyright Act privileged publishers who placed freelance journalists’ articles in electronic databases, Justice Ginsburg acknowledged that
there were several associated legal issues that needed clarification, but she exercised judicial restraint and refused to resolve them. One issue was whether
the § 201(c) privilege was transferrable from the owner of the collective work
to a third party, such as the electronic publishers.366 Although there is some authority for assignability, it was unnecessary for Justice Ginsburg to address this
issue to resolve Tasini, so she opted not to.367
Justice Ginsburg also refused to address an issue vigorously argued by the
Register of Copyrights: that the electronic publishers publicly displayed the
copyrighted articles, and because § 201(c) does not apply to public displays, the
electronic publishers’ conduct was not privileged.368 Instead, Justice Ginsburg
limited the Court’s holding to the conclusion that the publishers exercised reproduction and distribution rights.369 She left the issue raised by the Register of
Copyrights to wait until another day.
Another issue raised, but not addressed by Ginsburg in Tasini was whether
electronic databases can qualify as libraries and take advantage of special protections afforded to libraries in § 108 of the Copyright Act, among other places.370 Because those special protections would not absolve the publishers of liability, there was no need for Justice Ginsburg to resolve this question,371 so she
chose not to do so.
The final issue that Ginsburg noted but sidestepped in Tasini was whether
the publishers were able to take advantage of § 201(c) only if the electronic databases preserved the original selection, coordination, and arrangement of the
print publishers’ collective works.372 After raising this question and discussing
how the Second Circuit resolved it, Justice Ginsburg explained that the Court
would pass on the issue because the electronic databases did not contain revisions of the print collective works.373
3d 937, 945 n.5 (N.D. Ill. 2014); Frerck v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., No. 11-CV-2727, 2014
WL 3512991, at *6 n.5 (N.D. Ill. July 14, 2014); Grant Heilman Photography, Inc. v.
McGraw-Hill Cos., Inc., 28 F. Supp. 3d 399, 411 (E.D. Pa. 2014); Lefkowitz v. McGrawHill Global Educ. Holdings, LLC, 23 F. Supp. 3d 344, 357 n.11 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
365 N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001).
366 Id. at 492–93.
367 Id. at 493 (“[W]e find it unnecessary to determine whether the privilege is transferable.”). In fact, she repeated it again later in the opinion. See id. at 496 n.5 (“It bears repetition
here . . . that we neither decide nor express any view on whether the § 201(c) ‘privilege’ may
be transferred.”).
368 Id. at 498 n.8.
369 Id.
370 Id. at 503 n.12 (“We need not decide whether the Databases come within the legal coverage of the term ‘libraries’ as used in the Copyright Act.”).
371 Id. at 503.
372 Id. at 502 n.10.
373 Id.
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None of these unresolved issues in Tasini were earth-shattering. But all of
them evidence Justice Ginsburg’s reluctance to decide more than what was absolutely necessary to dispose of the dispute. Understanding that future cases
might provide new or more developed theories and arguments addressing these
issues, she expansively exercised judicial restraint. She allowed the wheels of
change to remain in motion, but also kept them moving slowly.
The third and fourth copyright opinions of interest were written by Ruth
Bader Ginsburg during her time on the D.C. Circuit. Then-Judge Ginsburg displayed her incrementalism in Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid374
and OddzOn Products, Inc. v. Oman.375 Reid concerned copyright law’s work
for hire doctrine.376 The question presented was whether a sculpture commissioned by a nonprofit was a work made for hire within the definition of § 101
of the Copyright Act,377 entitling the hiring party, rather than the sculptor, to
authorship status and, consequently, to ownership of the disputed copyright.378
Although Reid would eventually make it to the Supreme Court and set forth the
agency-law-based standard for distinguishing employees from independent
contractors,379 Ginsburg’s incrementalism was on display as an appellate judge
with respect to two other issues raised by Reid.
First, because the dispute was between the original sculptor and the organization that commissioned the making of the sculpture, there was a dispute
about ownership of and access to the finished product.380 Reid, the sculptor,
was concerned about CCNV’s travel plans for the sculpture and worried that it
might be damaged as a result.381 Because there was only one copy of the work,
then-Judge Ginsburg expressed some concern about Reid’s ability to exercise
his right under § 106(1) to reproduce the work.382 Rather than addressing this
tricky issue, Ginsburg, always the incrementalist, planted a seed for how this
374
375
376
377

Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 846 F.2d 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
OddzOn Prods., Inc. v. Oman, 924 F.2d 346 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
Reid, 846 F.2d at 1486.
Section 101 of the Copyright Act states in pertinent part:
A “work made for hire” is—
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment; or
(2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective work,
as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a supplementary
work, as a compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as answer material for a test, or as an
atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be
considered a work made for hire.

17 U.S.C. § 101.
378 Reid, 846 F.2d at 1489.
379 See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 736, 742–43 (1989); see
also Ryan Vacca, Work Made for Hire—Analyzing the Multifactor Balancing Test, 42 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 197, 218–22 (2014).
380 Reid, 846 F.2d at 1498.
381 Id.
382 Id. (“But singular works of art, we recognize, do not fit comfortably into a scheme centrally concerned with reproduction of the underlying work.”).
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could be resolved upon remand. She noted that CCNV had “once invited Reid
to have a ‘master mold’ of the sculpture made at Reid’s own expense,” and said
that she was unaware of any “current authority for a court to order renewal of
that invitation.”383 However, she did manage to find and cite to a 1912 Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts case, which provided some support for this
unique equitable relief.384
Ginsburg also urged a modest step toward expanding the concept of moral
rights in Reid.385 Although she did not declare that Reid, as copyright owner,
would have a claim against CCNV, she noted in her conclusion that if CCNV
“publish[ed] an excessively mutilated or altered version of [the sculpture],”
then Reid might have a claim under various statutory or common law doctrines.386 Reid was decided before the United States tepidly embraced moral
rights in the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990,387 so this suggestion in Reid was
a modest proposal toward further protection of authors.
In addition, then-Judge Ginsburg illustrated a few minor instances of incrementalism in OddzOn, some of which also arose in Star Athletica twentyfive years later. OddzOn involved the copyrightability of the KOOSH ball, a
toy with “hundreds of floppy, wiggly, elastomeric filaments radiating from a
core.”388 Three instances of incrementalism appear in OddzOn.
First, a question was raised about whether the KOOSH ball was a useful article.389 Because the petitioner did not challenge this categorization during the
application process or at the district court, then-Judge Ginsburg refused to review it.390 Second, because the KOOSH ball was classified as a useful article, it
could only be protected to the extent it had conceptually separable features.391
Ginsburg recognized the “notable lack of agreement among courts and commentators on the very meaning of ‘conceptual separability’ ”392 and declined the
invitation to “enter the ‘conceptual separability’ fray.”393 Again, Ginsburg
moved cautiously and avoided unnecessarily interpreting or making new law.
Finally, her incrementalism in OddzOn arose in her limited holding in the case.
Although she held that the Copyright Office did not abuse its discretion in refusing to register the KOOSH ball, she made it exceedingly clear that this was
all that was decided.394 In both the beginning and conclusion of her opinion,
Id.
Id. (citing Baker v. Libbie, 97 N.E. 109, 111–12 (Mass. 1912)).
385 Id. at 1498–99.
386 Id.
387 See Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, sec. 603, § 106A, 104 Stat.
5128.
388 OddzOn Prods., Inc. v. Oman, 924 F.2d 346, 347 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
389 Id. at 350.
390 Id.
391 Id. at 349.
392 Id. (citation omitted).
393 Id. at 350.
394 See id.
383
384
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Ginsburg emphasized that the court’s opinion only addressed whether the Copyright Office’s refusal to register was an abuse of discretion, and that it was not
deciding whether the KOOSH ball was entitled to copyright protection if the
issue arose in the context of an infringement action.395
3. Reinterpreting Precedent
The final instance of Justice Ginsburg’s incrementalism arises in the context of reinterpreting precedent. Her Grokster concurrence, which limited the
impact of the Court’s groundbreaking decision in Sony v. Universal City Studios, best exemplifies her role as a cautious copyright jurist, but one who still endeavors to make change.
Sony addressed a claim that secondary liability for infringement can arise
from the distribution of a commercial product.396 Plaintiffs, companies that held
copyrights in television programs and movies, sued Sony, the manufacturer of
Betamax videocassette recorders, on a theory of contributory liability.397 They
argued that because Sony made the machine that facilitated the copying, Sony
was responsible for the infringement that occurred when Betamax VCR owners
taped copyrighted programs.398
Borrowing the staple article of commerce doctrine from patent law, the
Sony Court ruled that product distributors cannot be held liable for users’ infringement so long as the product is “capable of substantial noninfringing uses.”399 The evidence showed that the VCR’s principal use was “time-shifting,”
taping a program for later viewing at a more convenient time, which the Court
found to be a fair use.400 Consequently, the VCR was “capable of substantial
noninfringing uses,” and the Court held that Sony was not secondarily liable for
infringing acts that might have been committed with a Sony Betamax by third
parties.401 This standard served as a baseline largely respected by innovators,
the copyrighted content industries, and the public for more than twenty
years.402
Then in the late 1990s and early 2000s, technological innovations in online
file sharing disrupted the music industry, which greatly influences copyright
law and policy.403 With massive numbers of users sharing massive amounts of
Id.
See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 420 (1984).
397 Id. at 434.
398 Id. at 420.
399 Id. at 442.
400 Id. at 454–55.
401 Id. at 456.
402 See Pamela Samuelson, Three Reactions to MGM v. Grokster, 13 MICH. TELECOMMS.
TECH. L. REV. 177, 185 (2006).
403 See Peter S. Menell, Envisioning Copyright Law’s Digital Future, 46 N.Y. L. SCH. L.
REV. 63, 116–17 (2002–2003) (“The amount of content available over the Internet took a
quantum leap in 1999 with the introduction of Napster’s peer-to-peer network technology.”).
395
396
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copyrighted music, copyright owners began filing lawsuits against peer-to-peer
file sharing companies, alleging that they were secondarily liable for their users’ acts of direct infringement, distributing unauthorized electronic copies of
copyrighted songs.404 How the Sony rule should be applied in the context of
online file sharing was hotly contested.
In 2005, MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster reached the Supreme Court.405 A
group of motion picture studios, recording companies, music publishers, and
songwriters brought the lawsuit against the makers of the Morpheus, Grokster,
and KaZaA software products, aiming to shut them down and set a useful precedent to use against other technology companies.406 The case raised fundamental questions about how extensively copyright laws should be allowed to slow
and impair technological innovation, and how far Sony’s staple article of commerce doctrine reached.407 All the Justices seemed to realize that it would be far
too culturally disruptive to upend the compromise reflected by the Sony rule.408
Instead, the Court created a new (or at least reinvigorated409) theory of secondary liability in copyright law: “inducement.”410 The Supreme Court held that
“one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe
copyright, as shown by clear expression or other afﬁrmative steps taken to foster infringement,” going beyond mere distribution with knowledge of thirdparty action, “is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties”
using the device, regardless of the device’s lawful uses.411
Grokster represented a shift in the balance between content owners and
technology producers by effectively carving out an exception to Sony’s substantial non-infringing use doctrine.412 The Court preserved the Sony rule by
starkly distinguishing the facts of that case from those in Grokster. In Sony, the
Court held that the manufacture and sale of the Betamax videotape recorder did
not subject Sony to liability for contributory copyright infringement resulting
from infringing uses by purchasers of the device because the Betamax was caSee, e.g., In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643, 645 (7th Cir. 2003); A&M
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1010–11 (9th Cir. 2001); Metro-GoldwynMayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1031 (C.D. Cal. 2003); UMG
Recording, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 350 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
405 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
406 Id. at 920–21.
407 See Samuelson, supra note 402, at 177–79 (“What MGM really wanted in Grokster was
for the Supreme Court to overturn or radically reinterpret the Sony decision and eliminate the
safe harbor for technologies capable of [substantial non-infringing uses].”).
408 See id. at 180–81.
409 Protecting Innovation and Art While Preventing Piracy: Hearing on S. 2560 Before the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th CONG. 134, 144, 146 (2004) (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights).
410 Grokster, 545 U.S. at 936.
411 Id. at 919, 936–37.
412 Peter S. Menell & Ryan Vacca, 3D Printing and US Copyright Law: Implications for
Software, Enforcement and Business Strategies, in 3D PRINTING AND BEYOND:
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND REGULATION 159, 176 (Dinusha Mendis et al. eds., 2019).
404
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pable of “substantial noninfringing uses.”413 Sony, the Court inaccurately
claimed, had not advertised the copyright infringing uses a Betamax could be
put to when it was marketing the machine.414 Grokster, on the other hand, was
alleged to have marketed its software to former users of peer-to-peer file sharing networks that had been shut down for infringing copyrights, such as Napster.415
Besides the majority opinion, there were two competing concurrences: one
written by Justice Ginsburg and joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Kennedy, and the other penned by Justice Breyer and joined by Justices Stevens and O’Connor. These two concurrences are really a dispute over the scope
of what remains of the Sony rule.416
In her concurrence, Justice Ginsburg questioned whether the record provided sufficient evidence of significant non-infringing uses.417 After quoting
extensively from Sony and explaining that the key to Sony’s triumph was that
the Court recognized that private, non-commercial time-shifting by consumers
was non-infringing,418 she noted that the Court did not “give precise content to
the question of how much [actual or potential] use is commercially significant.”419 Under Justice Ginsburg’s interpretation of Sony, she thought the defendants in Grokster could be liable under a contributory infringement theory
even if the majority’s newly recognized inducement standard was unsuccessful.420
Justice Ginsburg concluded that Grokster differed markedly from Sony because “there ha[d] been no finding of any fair use and little beyond anecdotal
evidence of noninfringing uses.”421 In drafting her concurrence, she expressly
signed on to the Court’s apparent long-term effort to eviscerate Sony’s effects,
piece-by-piece, without unduly alarming the technology companies. The Sony
majority had been a shaky one. The Court had the case argued twice because
some Justices were confused or conflicted enough to need a second round of
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984).
See Tony Long, June 7, 1975: Before Digital, Before VHS . . . There Was Betamax,
WIRED (June 7, 2011, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2011/06/0607betamax-vcrtelevision-recorder/ [https://perma.cc/H4PT-L7C8] (displaying 1978 Sony advertisement
urging customers to “Watch Whatever Whenever” and to “see any TV show you want to see
anytime you want to see it”); see also Photograph of Sony Corp. Betamax Advertisement
(1977),
https://clickamericana.com/wp-content/uploads/sony-betamax-ad-10-10-1977.jpg
[https://perma.cc/BS4K-ZJP7] (displaying an advertisement telling customers they can record television shows while sleeping, doing something else, or watching other shows).
415 Grokster, 545 U.S. at 925.
416 See Samuelson, supra note 402, at 183–84.
417 Grokster, 545 U.S. at 944–45 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); see also Samuelson, supra note
402, at 183.
418 Grokster, 545 U.S. at 943 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
419 Id. at 943–44 (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
442 (1984)).
420 Id. at 948–49; see also Samuelson, supra note 402, at 184.
421 Grokster, 545 U.S. at 945 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
413
414
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oral argument before they could reach a conclusion.422 When the opinion finally issued, the splits were unusual. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist
were at odds, and so were Justices Brennan and Marshall, who almost always
voted the same way.423 As explained earlier, copyright law has a different political valence than a simple liberal versus conservative divide,424 and it was very
evident in the Sony division. Justice Ginsburg’s Grokster concurrence advocated tightening the copyright constraints on distributive technologies.425 Though
she ostensibly endorsed preserving Sony, her concurrence reads much more like
the Sony dissent than the Sony majority opinion, and it deviates significantly
from the values underlying Sony.426
Justice Breyer’s concurrence worried that requiring the defendants to provide detailed business information would be helpful to copyright owners, but
“would simultaneously increase the legal uncertainty that surrounds the creation or development of a new technology capable of being put to infringing uses.”427 He described Justice Ginsburg’s approach as a significant narrowing of
Sony, writing: “[T]he real question is whether we should modify the Sony
standard, as MGM requests, or interpret Sony more strictly, as I believe Justice
Ginsburg’s approach would do in practice.”428
He further explained that “Justice Ginsburg’s approach would require defendants to produce considerably more concrete evidence—more than was presented here—to earn Sony’s shelter. That heavier evidentiary demand, and especially the more dramatic (case-by-case balancing) modifications that MGM
and the Government seek, would, I believe, undercut the protection that Sony
now offers.”429 Justice Breyer was concerned that inventors and entrepreneurs
would increasingly have to fear expensive, lengthy trials as a cost of introducing new technologies430 and that the broad interpretation of Sony was working
well to avoid discouraging innovative technologies while still protecting copyright owners.431

Sony, 464 U.S. at 42 (“[S]ince we had not completed our study of the case last Term, we
ordered reargument.”).
423 See generally id. See also The Supreme Court, 1989 Term, 104 HARV. L. REV. 40, 360
tbl.I(B) (1990) (showing Justices Brennan and Marshall voted together 94.2% of the time
during the 1989 Term).
424 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
425 Grokster, 545 U.S. at 942–49 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); see also Robert I. Reis, The
Sony Legacy: Secondary Liability Perspectives, 3 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 223, 266 n.281
(2009).
426 Laura A. Heymann, Inducement as Contributory Copyright Infringement: MetroGoldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 37 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMP. L. 31,
44 (2006).
427 Grokster, 545 U.S. at 959 (Breyer, J., concurring).
428 Id. at 956.
429 Id. at 959.
430 Id.
431 Id. at 956–66; see also Samuelson, supra note 402, at 184–85.
422
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How does Justice Ginsburg’s Grokster concurrence illustrate incrementalism? From one perspective, it appears as if her opinion is the most radical of
the three. She went the furthest in disrupting the delicate balance achieved over
twenty years ago. However, she did not choose to throw out Sony’s safe harbor
as a failure. Instead, she read Sony’s holding very narrowly, taking the majority
opinion at its word that it was not establishing a precise threshold for how
much non-infringing use was significant. This interpretation (or reinterpretation), when framed in this manner, makes Justice Ginsburg’s contribution seem like only a minor step beyond Sony’s limited holding. Justice
Ginsburg criticized Justice Breyer’s conclusion that Sony provided a clear rule
for contributory liability only when the product “will be used almost exclusively to infringe copyrights,”432 by pointing out a string of cases holding to the
contrary.433 This was an effort to approach changing the law incrementally herself and to restrict how expansively her colleagues could effect change. Viewed
in this light, her Grokster concurrence reflects her copyright law related incrementalism.434
III. INTERGOVERNMENTAL DEFERENCE
Another theme running through Justice Ginsburg’s copyright jurisprudence
is a marked deference to other government institutions.435 Driving this deference are two underlying and related beliefs. First, the evolution and interpretation of the law optimally occurs not as a diatribe against Congress, the President, administrative agencies, or the states, but as a dialogue with those other
institutions.436 Second, and related to the first, is that courts have institutional
capacity constraints and must engage in this cooperative intergovernmental dialogue to be effective. These two precepts cohered with her belief in incrementalism, a preference for evolving the law gradually and with due care.437

Grokster, 545 U.S. at 957 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id. at 944 n.1 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
434 For a similar analysis in the context of Justice Ginsburg’s jurisprudence on search and
seizure law, see Slobogin, supra note 259, at 879.
435 Her consideration of institutional considerations is not limited to copyright law. Professor Brudney similarly observed this to varying degrees in Justice Ginsburg’s criminal, labor,
and civil rights cases. See James J. Brudney, The Supreme Court as Interstitial Actor: Justice
Ginsburg’s Eclectic Approach to Statutory Interpretation, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 889, 901 (2009).
436 Ginsburg, Judicial Voice, supra note 281, at 1186.
437 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Opening Statement at the Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary
Committee (July 20, 1993), in GINSBURG ET AL., supra note 258, at 184 (“I would add that
the judge should carry out that function without fanfare, but with due care. She should decide the case before her without reaching out to cover cases not yet seen. She should be ever
mindful, as Judge and then Justice Benjamin Nathan Cardozo said, ‘Justice is not to be taken
by storm. She is to be wooed by slow advances.’ ”).
432
433
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A. Intergovernmental Dialogue
In 1992 Ginsburg gave a Madison Lecture at NYU School of Law entitled
“Speaking in a Judicial Voice.” In this speech, Ruth Bader Ginsburg expressed
approval for a dialogic approach to civil rights.438 She observed that the Court
generally invalidated discriminatory laws that had become obsolete.439 She also
noted, however, that in what she called “a core set of cases” that concerned social insurance benefits for the spouse or family of a worker, rather than condemn discriminatory laws, “the Court, in effect, opened a dialogue with the political branches of government.”440 Ginsburg stated:
In essence, the Court instructed Congress and state legislatures: rethink ancient
positions on these questions. Should you determine that special treatment for
women is warranted, i.e., compensatory legislation because of the sunken-in social and economic bias or disadvantage women encounter, we have left you a
corridor in which to move. But your classifications must be refined, adopted for
remedial reasons, and not rooted in prejudice about “the way women (or men)
are.”441

She made the important and very Ginsburgian observation that men would
gain, rather than lose, from these changes, noting, “[T]he Court’s decrees removed no benefits; instead, they extended to a woman worker’s husband, widower, or family benefits Congress had authorized only for members of a male
worker’s family.”442 She continued:
The ball, one might say, was tossed by the Justices back into the legislators’
court, where the political forces of the day could operate. The Supreme Court
wrote modestly, it put forward no grand philosophy; but by requiring legislative
reexamination of once-customary sex-based classifications, the Court helped to
ensure that laws and regulations would “catch up with a changed world.”443

Her words reveal a belief that courts should interact with other government
institutions as part of effecting changes in the law. Given the timing of the
speech, she must have been aware that she was being considered for a seat on
the Supreme Court, and her words may have been meant in part to reassure anyone listening that her approach to justice was not very radical, nor was she
likely to be an activist judge. But these remarks were also entirely in character
for Justice Ginsburg and sound even now quite sincere.
Justice Ginsburg favored intergovernmental dialogue in contexts other than
gender equality. For example, in a series of dissenting opinions in disputes
Ginsburg, Judicial Voice, supra note 281, at 1204.
Id.
440 Id.
441 Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Benign Classification in the Context of Sex, 10 CONN. L. REV. 813, 823 (1978)).
442 Id.
443 Id. at 1204–05 (footnote omitted) (quoting Wendy W. Williams, Sex Discrimination:
Closing the Law’s Gender Gap, in THE BURGER YEARS: RIGHTS AND WRONGS IN THE
SUPREME COURT 1969–1986, at 109, 123 (Herman Schwartz ed., 1987)).
438
439

22 NEV. L.J. 431

Spring 2022]

GINSBURG’S COPYRIGHT JURISPRUDENCE

481

about punitive damages, Justice Ginsburg thought the majority’s approach to
“nationalizing and constitutionalizing limits on punitive damages ‘in the face of
reform measures recently adopted or currently under consideration in legislative arenas’z” was ill-advised and “boldly out of order.”444
This belief in intergovernmental dialogue is also evident in her copyright
opinions. Her Petrella opinion exemplifies a commitment to maintaining a dialogue with Congress. Petrella concerned the equitable defense of laches, and
whether it was available as a defense to damages for particular acts of copyright infringement.445 Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority, held that it was
not.446 With respect to intergovernmental dialogue in Petrella, Ginsburg described the historical back and forth between Congress and the courts on the
laches and statutes of limitation issues. She noted that “[u]ntil 1957, federal
copyright law did not include a statute of limitations for civil suits. Federal
courts therefore used analogous state statutes of limitations to determine the
timeliness of infringement claims. And they sometimes invoked laches to
abridge the state-law prescription.”447 She further explained:
“When Congress fails to enact a statute of limitations, a [federal] court that borrows a state statute of limitations but permits it to be abridged by the doctrine of
laches is not invading congressional prerogatives. It is merely filling a legislative hole.” . . . In 1957, Congress addressed the matter and filled the hole; it prescribed a three-year lookback limitations period for all civil claims arising under
the Copyright Act.448

Thus the statute of limitations issue shifted to the courts, who borrowed
from analogous state statutes of limitation because Congress had given them
nothing useful to work with.449 But because this caused a lack of uniformity,
Congress stepped back in and remedied this omission in 1957 by enacting a
three-year limitations period.450 Ginsburg cited Senate and House reports to explain what Congress’s purposes were,451 and pointed to Congress’s awareness
of the policy implications of its decision.452 She concluded that “courts are not
at liberty to jettison Congress’ judgment on the timeliness of suit,”453 but imPamela S. Karlan, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1085, 1089 (2009) (first quoting B.M.W. of N. Am. v. Gore, 517
U.S. 559, 607 (1996) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); and then quoting State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 438 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)).
445 Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 572 U.S. 663, 667 (2014).
446 Id. at 668.
447 Id. at 669 (citation omitted).
448 Id. at 669–70 (citation omitted).
449 Id. at 669.
450 Id. at 669–70.
451 Id. at 670.
452 Id. at 683 (“Congress must have been aware that the passage of time and the author’s
death could cause a loss or dilution of evidence. Congress chose, nonetheless, to give the
author’s family ‘a second chance to obtain fair remuneration.’ ” (quoting Stewart v. Abend,
495 U.S. 207, 220 (1990))).
453 Id. at 667.
444
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plicitly suggested that if Congress were dissatisfied with the Court’s interpretation or that the limitations period was causing unforeseen hardships, then Congress was free to carry on the conversation and change the law.454
Ginsburg’s dialogic interests in copyright cases also extended to the Copyright Office. In a series of cases involving the registrability of particular copyrights, then-Judge Ginsburg deferred to the Copyright Office as part of an intergovernmental dialogue. The first case, Atari I,455 involved the videogame
Breakout.456 The game displayed a wall of red, amber, green, and blue “bricks,”
and the player controlled a rectangular “paddle” to hit a square bouncing “ball”
against the brick wall.457 When the ball hit the bricks, the bricks disappeared
and the player earned points.458 Simple sound effects accompanied the
graphics.459
Atari attempted to register a copyright in the game as an audiovisual work,
but the Copyright Office refused to allow it.460 After several rounds of reconsideration, the Copyright Office refused registration on the grounds that the geometric shapes, colors, and individual tones were unoriginal and not copyrightable.461 Atari appealed to the district court, which affirmed the Copyright
Office.462
On appeal to the D.C. Circuit, then-Judge Ginsburg noted that the court reviewed Copyright Office decisions under an abuse of discretion standard.463
But because the Copyright Office had failed to clearly articulate what standard
of originality it was applying and whether it was considering the work as a
whole (as opposed to its component parts), she remanded the case for further
consideration by the Copyright Office.464
The second case in this series is OddzOn, which asked whether the Copyright Office erred by refusing to register a copyright in a KOOSH ball.465 Like
in Atari I, the Copyright Office refused to register the copyright.466 This time,
the Copyright Office’s reason for the rejection was that the shape of the ball
was an uncopyrightable sphere, and that the tactile feel of the KOOSH ball fil-

454
455
456
457
458
459
460
461
462
463
464
465
466

Id. at 669–70.
Atari I, 888 F.2d 878 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
Id. at 879.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 879–80.
Atari Games Corp. v. Oman, 693 F. Supp. 1204, 1206 (D.D.C. 1988).
Atari I, 888 F.2d at 881.
Id.
OddzOn Prods., Inc. v. Oman, 924 F.2d 346, 347 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
Id.
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aments was a functional, and hence uncopyrightable, part of the work.467 The
district court affirmed the Copyright Office’s refusal.468
On appeal to the D.C. Circuit, OddzOn argued that Atari I required remand
to the Copyright Office.469 But then-Judge Ginsburg rejected the analogy, explaining that the refusal in OddzOn was on different grounds, and that this interpretation of the law was not arbitrary.470
Most important for purposes of intergovernmental dialogue was Judge
Ginsburg’s discussion of the conceptual separability doctrine. Because the
KOOSH ball was a “useful article,” the only features eligible for protection
were those that were conceptually separable from the utilitarian aspects of the
article.471 Until the Supreme Court expressly addressed the issue in 2017,472
there was much judicial confusion over what the proper test for conceptual separability was.473 Rather than jump into the circuit split, Judge Ginsburg deferred to the Copyright Office’s interpretation of the doctrine as a way to allow
continued development of this area of the law.474
The final case in the series is Atari II.475 This case actually illustrates Ginsburg’s willingness to conclude a dialogue when appropriate. Her opinion in
Atari II ultimately concluded the conversation between the courts and the Copyright Office on the copyrightability of the video game Breakout. After Ginsburg remanded the case to the Copyright Office for further consideration in
Atari I, the Copyright Office again refused to register Atari’s copyright in the
audiovisual aspect of the Breakout videogame.476 Importantly, between Atari I
and Atari II, the Supreme Court had handed down its decision in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.477 Feist established the standard for
copyrightability in compilations and emphasized that it was an extremely low
standard that required very little in the way of creativity.478 Although the Copyright Office claimed to have considered the work as a whole, Judge Ginsburg

Id.
Id.
469 Id. at 348.
470 Id. at 348–50.
471 Id. at 349; 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “useful article”).
472 See Star Athletica, LLC v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002 (2017).
473 OddzOn, 924 F.2d at 349 (“[T]here is a notable lack of agreement among courts and
commentators on the very meaning of ‘conceptual separability.’ ”); see also Ochoa, supra
note 349, at 105 (“The Supreme Court likely granted certiorari because the Sixth Circuit
identified no fewer than nine different tests that courts and commentators had proposed for
resolving the issue, and the Sixth Circuit adopted a tenth.”).
474 OddzOn, 924 F.2d at 350.
475 Atari II, 979 F.2d 242 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
476 Id. at 243.
477 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
478 Id. at 345 (“To be sure, the requisite level of creativity is extremely low; even a slight
amount will suffice. The vast majority of works make the grade quite easily . . . .”).
467
468
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thought the refusal letters indicated an inappropriate focus on the individual
components.479
Under the Feist standard, Judge Ginsburg concluded that the Copyright Office’s rationale for determining that Breakout was insufficiently creative was
incorrect.480 Effectively cutting off the extended dialogue between her court
and the Copyright Office on this issue, Ginsburg opined that “[i]t is not the
Register’s task to shape the protection threshold or ratchet it up” beyond what
Feist commands.481 Of course, the true end of the greater conversation was not
of Judge Ginsburg’s making; it was the Supreme Court, which she would join
less than a year later, that ended the dialogue with its Feist holding.
The final and perhaps best example of Justice Ginsburg’s desire to dialogically engage other governmental institutions arose in Kirtsaeng I. The Court in
Kirtsaeng I was resolving a dispute about whether the first sale doctrine applied
to imported products that were lawfully manufactured abroad.482 Justice Ginsburg dissented and would have held that the first sale doctrine does not apply to
foreign-manufactured products.483 Part of her rationale for rejecting international exhaustion relied on representations by other institutions. First, she spent
part of her dissent tracing the history of the copyright reform efforts that took
place in the 1960s and early 1970s.484 Surveilling the lengthy revision process
involving the Copyright Office, various stakeholders, and Congress convinced
her that everyone involved in the process had considered the issue and come to
a resolution different from the majority’s conclusion.485
In addition, Justice Ginsburg wanted to judicially acknowledge the executive branch’s position in international trade negotiations.486 Justice Ginsburg
noted that the government had concluded that international exhaustion “would
be inconsistent with the long-term economic interests of the United States” and
would be inconsistent with positions it had taken in international trade negotiations.487 Justice Ginsburg’s approach to the issue, she asserted, would be consistent with the executive branch’s approach in trade negotiation.488 In fact, Justice Ginsburg thought her conclusions were clearly supported, but might well
have reached the same conclusion even if the text and history of the Copyright

Atari II, 979 F.2d at 245–46.
Id. at 247.
481 Id.
482 Kirtsaeng I, 568 U.S. 519, 525 (2013).
483 Id. at 557 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
484 Id. at 568–73.
485 Id.
486 Id. at 573.
487 Id. at 575–76.
488 Id. at 576 n.15 (“After Quality King . . . the United States reconsidered its position, and it
now endorses the interpretation of the § 109(a) phrase ‘lawfully made under this title’ I
would adopt.”).
479
480
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Act were ambiguous.489 She feared that the majority’s interpretation would
harm the United States’ “role as a trusted partner in multilateral endeavors.”490
In Justice Ginsburg’s view, the intergovernmental dialogue on the first sale
doctrine was in full swing, but the majority’s approach cut it off mid-sentence.
Though aware that Congress could always amend the Copyright Act to overrule
Kirtsaeng I and restart the dialogue, Justice Ginsburg seemed concerned that
the conversation was terminated prematurely.491
B. Institutional Capacity Deference
Justice Ginsburg believed that courts are limited in their power and face institutional capacity constraints that sometimes require them to defer to other

Id. at 577 (“Even if the text and history of the Copyright Act were ambiguous on the answer to the question this case presents—which they are not—I would resist a holding out of
accord with the firm position the United States has taken on exhaustion in international negotiations.”).
490 Id. at 578 (quoting Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528,
539 (1995)). Justice Ginsburg was concerned with interrupting this dialogue in Quality King.
During oral argument, she asked the Deputy Solicitor General if the circuit courts’ different
approaches was important to the government. Counsel responded, “We do think it’s important because it bears on positions we’ve been taking in international negotiations.” Transcript of Oral Argument at 40–41, Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L’anza Research Int’l, Inc.,
523 U.S. 135 (1998) (No. 96-1470).
491 Intergovernmental dialogue also arose in Aereo, an opinion Justice Ginsburg joined but
did not author. Arriving at its decision, the Court traced the dialogue between Congress and
the Court with respect to transmissions of over-the-air broadcasts. Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo,
Inc., 573 U.S. 431, 439–42 (2014). In 1968, the Court in Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists
Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968), held that a community antenna television (CATV) system that retransmitted signals did not perform the copyrighted works and therefore was not
infringing. Aereo, 573 U.S. at 439–40. Six years later in Teleprompter Corp. v. CBS, 415
U.S. 394 (1974), the Court held that a CATV provider that carried broadcast programming
into subscribers’ homes hundreds of miles away and exercised some choice over what to
transmit was similarly not performing the copyrighted works. Aereo, 573 U.S. at 440–41. In
the 1976 Copyright Act, Congress rejected Fortnightly and Teleprompter by broadening the
definition of “perform,” adding a transmission clause to the definition of “public performance,” and adding a section to regulate cable companies’ public performance of copyrighted works. Id. at 441–42. Aereo was the next exchange in this dialogue between Congress and
the Court. The Court acknowledged that Aereo’s system differed from the systems in Fortnightly and Teleprompter, but this did not matter. Id. at 443–44. Instead, the Court recognized that the dialogue about how to regulate new technologies that broadcast copyrighted
works could continue. The Court noted that interested stakeholders concerned about the issue were “free to seek action from Congress.” Id. at 451.
Similarly, intergovernmental dialogue arose in Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994 (2020).
The Court held that state sovereign immunity was not properly abrogated by Congress in the
Copyright Remedy Clarification Act of 1990. Id. Justice Breyer wrote a short concurring
opinion, which Justice Ginsburg joined, expressing their belief that the Court’s precedent on
this issue was incorrectly decided. Id. at 1008–09 (Breyer, J., concurring). Their concurrence
described the unfairness to copyright owners and suggested that Congress may want to “venture into this great constitutional unknown.” Id. at 1009.
489
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governmental institutions.492 She explained during her Madison Lecture at
NYU School of Law that effective judges must persuade the political branches
of government to endorse their judgments, opining:
The judiciary, Hamilton wrote, from the very nature of its functions, will always
be “the least dangerous” branch of government, for judges hold neither the
sword nor the purse of the community; ultimately, they must depend upon the
political branches to effectuate their judgments. Mindful of that reality, the effective judge, I believe and will explain why in these remarks, strives to persuade, and not to pontificate.493

Several examples of institutional capacity deference appear in her copyright opinions. Her conclusions in the Eldred and Golan cases both demonstrate
deference to Congress in determining the proper duration of copyright protection. Eldred tested the constitutionality of a specific piece of legislation, the
Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA), which added twenty years to most
copyrights, both prospectively and retroactively.494 During oral arguments in
Eldred, Justice Ginsburg asked the following questions with respect to whether
life plus seventy years ran afoul of the “limited times” language of the IP
Clause of the U.S. Constitution:
But there has to be a limit, as you acknowledge. Perpetual copyright is not permitted. Who is the judge of—within that line? Who is the judge of when it becomes unlimited? Is there, in other words, judicial review and, if there is, what
standard will this Court apply to determine whether something short of perpetual
is still unlimited?495

Her query expressed her curiosity about which institution was best positioned to determine how long is too long for copyright protections to subsist. If
the judiciary took on this role, she did not know on what bases the courts would
decide. She felt that there was nothing about judges that made them inherently
superior in determining the outer limits of copyright duration, as long as those
limits were outside the bounds of perpetual copyright protection, which is constitutionally prohibited by Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution
fairly unambiguously.
In her majority opinion in Eldred, she criticized Justice Breyer’s argument
that the economic incentives created by the CTEA’s additional twenty years of
copyright protection were too insignificant to cause an author to create more
new works or do anything differently.496 It was not that she believed that he
was necessarily wrong in his analysis, but Justice Ginsburg thought the issue
should not be a matter of the Court’s concern. She explained that “[c]alibrating
Unlike Vanilla Ice, who declared, “If there was a problem, yo, I’ll solve it,” a judge relying on institutional capacity deference would say, “If there is a problem, yo, someone else
should solve it.” See VANILLA ICE, Ice Ice Baby, on TO THE EXTREME (SBK Records 1990).
493 Ginsburg, Judicial Voice, supra note 281, at 1186 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at
465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
494 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 195 (2003).
495 Transcript of Oral Argument at 40, Eldred, 537 U.S. 186 (No. 01-618).
496 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 207 n.15.
492
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rational economic incentives . . . is a task primarily for Congress, not the
courts.”497 She described how Congress had heard testimony from several witnesses in making its decisions about the content of the CTEA, and she stated
that the Court should not “take Congress to task for crediting this evidence.”498
Similarly, she wrote that the Court was “not at liberty to second-guess congressional determinations and policy judgments of this order, however debatable or
arguably unwise they may be.”499 It was not just that the Court should give rational basis review to such decisions; the Court, she believed, had no legitimate
way of determining what the proper duration of copyright protection should
be.500 Her concluding sentences in Eldred highlight her position. She wrote,
“[P]etitioners forcefully urge that Congress pursued very bad policy in prescribing the CTEA’s long terms. The wisdom of Congress’ action, however, is
not within our province to second-guess. [We are s]atisfied that the legislation
before us remains inside the domain the Constitution assigns to the First
Branch.”501
The Golan case concerned the 1994 decision by Congress to give “works
enjoying copyright protection abroad the same full term of protection available
to U.S. works” in order to perfect U.S. implementation of the Berne Convention and as part of the U.S. response to the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade
negotiations.502 Congress accomplished this in Section 514 of the Uruguay
Round Agreements Act (URAA), which granted copyright protection to preexisting works of Berne member countries that were protected in their country of
origin but lacked protection in the United States for one of three reasons: “[t]he
United States did not protect works from the country of origin at the time of
publication; the United States did not protect sound recordings fixed before
1972; or the author had failed to comply with U.S. statutory formalities,” which
were no longer required as prerequisites to copyright protection.503
Justice Ginsburg’s jurisprudential approach to Golan mirrored her opinion
in Eldred. Again writing for the majority, she explained that the decision by
Congress to extend copyright protections to foreign works that had previously
fallen into the public domain was not a decision the Court had “warrant to reject” because Congress had determined that doing so would further the IP
Clause’s objectives.504 When framed as broadly as this, it is no wonder she
Id.
Id. at 208 n.15.
499 Id. at 208.
500 Although Justice Breyer uses calculations by amici to show that life plus seventy years
creates a term worth 99.8% of the value of a perpetual copyright, Justice Ginsburg responds
that such calculations are unhelpful because prior acts’ shorter terms were demonstrated to
be 99.4%, 97.7%, and 94.1% and do not provide the Court any way to draw the line between
permitted and unpermitted durations. Id. at 209–10 n.16.
501 Id. at 222.
502 Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302, 307 (2012).
503 Id.
504 Id. at 327.
497
498
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thought that the Court would be without the institutional capacity to resolve this
question. In response to a question raised about orphan works, Justice Ginsburg
specifically mentioned institutional capacity as a reason to leave it unaddressed.505 She explained that the issue was not “a matter appropriate for judicial, as opposed to legislative, resolution. Indeed, the host of policy and logistical questions identified by the dissent speak for themselves.”506
Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion in Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corp.
v. Wall-Street.com, LLC also illustrates her institutional capacity deference.
Fourth Estate addressed the question of whether a copyright registration was
made for the purposes of § 411(a) upon filing an application with the Copyright
Office or upon actual registration or rejection by the Copyright Office.507 Arguing for the “application approach,” Fourth Estate asserted that copyright owners
might lose their ability to enforce their rights if the Copyright Office did not act
quickly enough to process a registration application, and the statute of limitations expired.508 Justice Ginsburg rejected this argument, noting that the current
processing time for applications was seven months, which would leave ample
time to file suit.509 Illustrating institutional capacity deference once again, she
stated that although it was true that the registration scheme was not working as
Congress envisioned (with processing times increasing from a couple weeks in
1956 to seven months today), the delays were “attributable, in large measure, to
staffing and budgetary shortages that Congress can alleviate, but courts cannot
cure.”510 Because of the judiciary’s inability to directly address the delay problem, she found this policy argument unpersuasive.
A final instance of institutional capacity deference vis à vis Congress appeared in Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland International, Inc.,511 a case in
which the Court split four-four on the question of whether a computer program’s menu command was copyrightable in light of the functional aspects the
menu command performs.512 The case went to the Court from the First Circuit,
where Judge Boudin wrote a concurring opinion in which he asserted that perhaps menu commands should receive only short periods of protection under the
Copyright Act.513 During oral argument, Justice Ginsburg expressed deep concern about Judge Boudin’s suggestion, stating:

Id. at 334.
Id. at 334–35 (citations omitted).
507 Fourth Est. Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC (Fourth Estate), 139 S. Ct. 881,
888 (2019).
508 Id. at 892.
509 Id.
510 Id.
511 Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 516 U.S. 233 (1996).
512 See id.
513 Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 822 (1st Cir. 1995) (Boudin, J.,
concurring).
505
506
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What I was suggesting is that we are dealing with the statute and you’ve been
featuring Judge Boudin who at the end says, some solutions, e.g., a very short
copyright period for menus. So, that makes me wonder what is he doing. Menus
maybe are protected too much and maybe they shouldn’t be protected for as
long. So, he’s really struggling with this idea. But the notion that because there
may be too much protection, the Court should then revise the statute is troubling.514

What Judge Boudin actually said in his concurring opinion was that some
solutions, such as a shortened period of copyright protection for menus, “are
not options at all for courts but might be for Congress.”515 He continued, “In all
events, the choices are important ones of policy, not linguistics, and they
should be made with the underlying considerations in view.”516 Justice Ginsburg and Judge Boudin were actually on the same page. Both thought courts
were ill suited to determine the proper scope of protection for menu commands,
which was a policy decision that Congress was best equipped to address.
Justice Ginsburg exhibited institutional capacity deference not only toward
Congress, but also deferred to administrative agencies on the basis of institutional capacity constraints. In 1983, then-Judge Ginsburg wrote her very first
copyright opinion in National Cable Television Ass’n v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal.517 The appeal to the D.C. Circuit was from Copyright Royalty Tribunal
(CRT), a congressionally created agency established to adjust royalty rates and
to allocate royalties among copyright owners for compulsory licenses related to
cable television retransmissions.518
In short, the CRT raised the royalty rates after the Federal Communications
Commission repealed its distant signal and syndicated program exclusivity
rules.519 Unhappy with the newly established rates, the NCTA requested that
the court vacate the CRT’s decision.520 Ginsburg laid out the Administrative
Procedure Act’s standard for reviewing agency decisions and asserted that wide
latitude should be granted to the CRT because Congress gave very little substantive guidance on how to determine “reasonable” rates.521 She next described how the CRT determined the rates and how this process involved the
CRT using its “best guess”522 because the evidence submitted by the parties
was either “useless” or “far from perfect.”523 Although much of the opinion in-

Transcript of Oral Argument at 48–49, Lotus, 516 U.S. 233 (No. 94-2003).
Lotus, 49 F.3d at 822.
516 Id.
517 Nat’l Cable Television Ass’n v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 724 F.2d 176, 179 (D.C.
Cir. 1983).
518 Id.
519 Id. at 182–83, 187.
520 Id. at 181.
521 Id. at 181–82.
522 Id. at 187.
523 Id. at 183–84.
514
515
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vokes long-established deference to administrative agencies, Ginsburg, in her
concluding comments about the distant signal carriage fees, wrote:
In sum, the Tribunal sought to estimate a market price in the absence of a functioning market. It used the best, indeed, the only, analogies available to it. It
could not mathematically derive its ultimate decision. Inevitably, it used its expert judgment to make a “best guess”; we are not positioned to offer a better
one.524

Ginsburg used the court’s lack of capacity to do a good job determining
royalty rates as a reason for affirming the CRT’s decisions. She observed that
because Congress provided “virtually no instruction as to the factors that bear
on the reasonableness of the adjusted rates,” the CRT’s rate adjustments are
subject to a “zone of reasonableness” review.525 And most relevant for purposes
of institutional capacity deference is her final statement: “If the Tribunal turns
out to have misjudged the impact its higher royalty rates will have on the cable
industry or on copyright owners, it can reconsider and modify the changes it
has ordered in 1985 when its next rate adjustment proceeding will almost certainly occur.”526
Because the court was in no better position to determine royalty rates than
the CRT—the court would have the same evidence and most likely less expertise—Ginsburg deferred to the CRT for this rate setting process and concluded
that error correction should also be within the CRT’s purview.
To be sure, the institutional capacity deference theme running through a
number of Justice Ginsburg’s copyright opinions is more subtle than her incrementalism.527 But when combined with her commitment to intergovernmental
dialogic exchanges, it adds a powerful example of Justice Ginsburg’s approach
to developing the law in a thoughtful, restrained, and cooperative manner.
IV. SEEKING ALTERNATIVES
The next theme running through Justice Ginsburg’s copyright opinions is
her willingness to seek alternative avenues of redress or relief in order to minimize the social disruptions caused by a particular outcome in a case. She explained her interest in seeking creative alternative approaches to justice during
her confirmation hearings, stating, “It is much easier to criticize than to come
up with an alternative. So, as a general matter, I would never tear down unless I
am sure I have a better building to replace what is being torn down.”528 This
Part first examines Ginsburg’s use of alternatives in copyright cases and then
juxtaposes this practice with her critique of alternatives in gender equality cases.
524
525
526
527
528

Id. at 187 (emphasis added).
Id. at 190.
Id.
See supra Section II.B.
Confirmation Hearing, supra note 260, at 155.
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A. Alternatives Galore in Copyright
Justice Ginsburg robustly demonstrated her interest in alternative remedies
in the Tasini case. In Tasini, the Court ruled that the defendant publishers were
not entitled to use the Copyright Act’s § 201(c) privilege to avoid paying freelance authors the royalties they were entitled to after their articles were included in electronic publishers’ databases without their permission.529 The publishers and many interested third parties worried that if the freelancers won, the
enormous quantity of articles they had written might become difficult or even
impossible for the public to access, leaving a veritable hole in the nation’s journalistic history.530 Justice Ginsburg decided that the social disruption that resulted from the freelancers’ victory in Tasini could be minimized if the Court
declined to issue an injunction preventing inclusion of the disputed articles in
databases and focused instead on creating a remedy that got the freelancers
paid, drawing on mechanisms such as compulsory licenses and consent decrees.531 She also pointedly reminded the parties that they had alternative methods of advancing their interests through private negotiation and contractual arrangements.532 After remand, the parties entered into a class action
settlement,533 which eventually made its way back to the Supreme Court and
was affirmed in Muchnick.534
Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.535 is another example of Justice
Ginsburg seeking out or pitching creative alternatives to avoid or minimize social disruptions. Kirtsaeng I presented the question of whether the Copyright
Act’s first sale doctrine included the concept of international exhaustion.536
That is, if a copyrighted item is manufactured and sold abroad, did the copyright owner have the ability to prohibit subsequent sales of that item?537 The
Kirtsaeng I Court held that international exhaustion applied, and the copyright
owner had no power under the Copyright Act to restrict sales after an initial authorized sale abroad.538 The majority identified several problems that would result if an alternative, geographically restrained approach were adopted.

N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 492–93, 506 (2001).
Id. at 504–05.
531 Id. at 505.
532 Id. at 502 n.11. During oral argument, Justice Ginsburg also suggested two alternatives.
First is that the three-year statute of limitations might reduce some of the risk for publishers.
And second, that the authors want their works electronically published because they have an
interest in exposure. Transcript of Oral Argument at 9–10, Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (No. 00201).
533 In re Literary Works in Elec. Databases, 509 F.3d 116, 119–20 (2d Cir. 2007), rev’d,
Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154 (2010).
534 Muchnick, 559 U.S. at 159–60, 170–71.
535 Kirtsaeng I, 568 U.S. 519 (2013).
536 Id. at 525.
537 Id.
538 Id. at 530.
529
530
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In her dissenting rebuttal, Justice Ginsburg articulated alternative approaches that reduced or eliminated those social disruptions. The majority referred to the Solicitor General’s statement at oral argument that between international exhaustion and the geographic interpretation, the geographic
interpretation would be worse because such goods would be subject to continuing licensing requirements, or as the majority phrased it, “perpetual downstream control.”539 But Justice Ginsburg argued that this concern was that authorized sale, and further distribution, could occur without the copyright
owner’s permission.540 In short, she asserted that there was no risk of perpetual
control because existing interpretations of the first sale doctrine would kick in.
The majority expressed additional concerns that a geographic interpretation
of the first sale doctrine would limit libraries from circulating millions of foreign-produced books because they would have no practical way of obtaining
permission.541 The majority asked, “Are the libraries to stop circulating or distributing or displaying the millions of books in their collections that were printed abroad?”542 Justice Ginsburg responded that the Copyright Act actually facilitated this type of activity543 because § 602(a)(3)(C) permitted “an
organization operated for scholarly, educational, or religious purposes to import, without the copyright owner’s authorization, up to five . . . copies of a
[work] for library lending or archival purposes.”544
The majority also worried about the effect on art museums.545 A geographical interpretation, the majority reasoned, “would require the museums to obtain permission from the copyright owners before they could display the
work—even if the copyright owner has already sold or donated the work to a
foreign museum.”546 Again, Justice Ginsburg pointed out alternatives to minimize this concern.547 She initially acknowledged that the museums could try to
seek permission from copyright owners.548 But even in the absence of express
permission, she observed that implied licenses and fair use could also serve as
tools to allow museums to legally display art created abroad.549
Finally, the majority raised concerns about consumer goods550 because
many consumer goods that are manufactured abroad contain copyrighted software, packaging, logos, instructions, et cetera.551 The majority worried that a
539
540
541
542
543
544
545
546
547
548
549
550
551

Id. at 553.
Id. at 580 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 541 (majority opinion).
Id.
Id. at 583 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 543 (majority opinion).
Id.
Id. at 584 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 542 (majority opinion).
Id.
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geographical interpretation would prevent the resale of tangible goods, including products like automobiles, because they contained copyrighted software.552
As neither foreign manufacturers nor American purchasers regularly obtain
permission from copyright holders to import objects of manufacture that utilize
copyrighted software, subsequent sales in the United States would be subject to
the threat of litigation.553 Similarly, a tourist who purchased a copyrighted work
abroad would not be able to display or resell the copy in the United States
without authorization.554 This, the majority feared, could be chaotic.
Justice Ginsburg again listed alternative mechanisms to minimize the risk
of social disruptions. As for museums, she asserted that the principles of express licenses, implied licenses, and fair use were tools to enable the legal resale of products without the necessity of obtaining a copyright owner’s permission.555 These same principles would also allow tourists to display or resell
their copies.556 She also invoked § 602(a)(3)(B) of the Copyright Act, which
states that the ban on imports does not apply to “any person arriving from outside the United States . . . with respect to copies . . . forming part of such person’s personal baggage” as long as it is for private use and not for distribution.557 Finally, Justice Ginsburg explained that the majority’s concerns were
overblown because of the realities of the marketplace.558 She observed that
“[r]outinely suing one’s customers is hardly a best business practice” and that
manufacturers “may be hesitant to do business with software programmers taken to suing consumers.”559 Moreover, “[m]anufacturers may also insist that
software programmers agree to contract terms barring such lawsuits.”560 Although Justice Ginsburg was unable to fully allay all of the majority’s concerns
enough to persuade them to vote with her in Kirtsaeng I, her presentation of alternative avenues for relief assisted the majority in accurately identifying the
policy effects of the case’s outcome.
Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc.561 provides yet another illustration
of Justice Ginsburg’s predilection for seeking alternatives. Writing for the majority, she found that laches could not preclude a claim for damages brought
within the three-year statute of limitations period.562 The defendants and dissenting Justices expressed concern that because of a long period of delay, a defendant might be harmed by its reliance on the plaintiff’s silence, or by the loss
552
553
554
555
556
557
558
559
560
561
562

Id.
Id. at 542–43.
Id. at 537.
Id. at 584 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 584 n.25.
Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 602(a)(3)(B)).
Id. at 585.
Id. at 585–86.
Id. at 586.
Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 572 U.S. 663 (2014).
Id. at 666–67, 679.
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of potential evidence.563 Justice Ginsburg recognized this potential for injustice
and wrote that an alternative mechanism, the doctrine of estoppel, could play a
role in alleviating some of these concerns.564 She acknowledged that estoppel
was not a complete replacement for laches and that estoppel requires a more
exacting test,565 but she felt it was still a useful alternative tool to help address
some of the contrary concerns.566
Golan v. Holder567 was yet another case in which Justice Ginsburg articulated an alternative avenue of relief to mollify the dissent’s policy trepidations.
One concern about restoring copyright protection in foreign works was that entities currently using the works based on an understanding that they were in the
public domain would be deprived of their investments in these works.568 In
counterpoint, Justice Ginsburg noted that under the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Congress had created additional protections for reliance parties.569 If
users of the previously unprotected materials had exploited the work prior to
restoration, then the user could continue using the work until the copyright
owner actually or constructively notifies the user.570 And even after notification, the reliance party could continue exploiting the work for an additional
year.571 Finally, reliance parties who created derivative works based on previously unprotected works could continue to exploit their derivative works upon
payment of “reasonable compensation.”572
The final case in which Justice Ginsburg listed alternatives to eliminate or
minimize counter-arguments is Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corp. v. WallStreet.com, LLC.573 In this case, she held that “registration has been made”
when the Copyright Office registers (or refuses to register) a copyright, and not
simply by filing the application.574 The plaintiff argued that waiting until registration occurred would harm plaintiffs because it delays their ability to file suit
and seek relief.575 Justice Ginsburg acknowledged the possibility, but listed two
alternative mechanisms that tempered its effects. First, Congress created a system of preregistration that applies to categories of works that are especially
susceptible to infringement before the works have been published.576 Second,
Id. at 689–90 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 684 (majority opinion).
565 Id.
566 Id. at 684–85.
567 Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302 (2012).
568 Id. at 315–16.
569 Id. at 316.
570 Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 104A(c), (d)(2)(A)(i), (B)(i)).
571 Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 104A(d)(2)(A)(ii), (B)(ii)).
572 Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 104A(d)(3)).
573 Fourth Est. Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC (Fourth Estate), 139 S. Ct. 881
(2019).
574 Id. at 892.
575 Id. at 891.
576 Id. at 892 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 408(f)).
563
564
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the Copyright Office permits copyright claimants to seek expedited review of
their application, which is normally accomplished within five days.577 These
alternative avenues, according to Justice Ginsburg, provided some relief for
copyright owners in light of the Court’s interpretation of the language to require more than simply filing the application before bringing suit.
B. Suspicion of Alternatives in Gender Equality
Justice Ginsburg treated alternatives in equal protection cases differently
than she did in copyright cases. Unlike her Goliath-favoring copyright opinions, in social justice cases Justice Ginsburg’s focus was almost always on the
underdog.578 In 1973, when she was still a law professor, Ruth Bader Ginsburg
penned a short article on the need for the proposed Equal Rights Amendment.579 In this article, she noted that “[o]pponents of the amendment suggest
the pursuit of alternate routes: particularized statutes through the regular legislative process in Congress and in the states, and test case litigation under the
Fourteenth Amendment.”580 This, she opined, was ill-advised because “[o]nly
those who have failed to learn the lessons of the past can accept that counsel.”581
Her skepticism toward alternatives in social justice contexts carried over
into her role as a jurist. In perhaps her most famous opinion, United States v.
Virginia,582 also known as the VMI case, Justice Ginsburg was highly critical
of alternatives proffered by those who would retain gender segregation.583 This
case involved an equal protection challenge to Virginia’s exclusion of women
from its public military college, Virginia Military Institute (VMI).584 After VMI
prevailed in the district court, the Fourth Circuit vacated the decision and remanded the case so Virginia could select and implement a remedial course.585
Rather than admit women to VMI, Virginia chose to create a parallel program
for women—the Virginia Women’s Institute for Leadership (VWIL) at Mary
Baldwin College.586 The allure of “separate but equal” as a justification to retain segregation clearly had not disappeared after Brown v. Board of Education.587
Id. at 892 n.6.
See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
579 Ginsburg, supra note 294, at 1013.
580 Id.
581 Id.
582 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
583 Id. at 553 (“[T]he Commonwealth has created a VWIL program fairly appraised as a
‘pale shadow’ of VMI in terms of the range of curricular choices and faculty stature, funding, prestige, alumni support and influence.”).
584 Id. at 519.
585 Id. at 525.
586 Id. at 526.
587 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
577
578
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Although VWIL shared VMI’s mission of producing “citizen-soldiers,”
there were differences between the institutes.588 Nonetheless, the district court
determined that “the two schools would achieve substantially similar outcomes.”589 The district judge wrote, “If VMI marches to the beat of a drum,
then Mary Baldwin marches to the melody of a fife and when the march is
over, both will have arrived at the same destination.”590 On appeal, the Fourth
Circuit recognized some of the differences between the programs but concluded
that the educational opportunities were “sufficiently comparable.”591
At the Supreme Court, Justice Ginsburg soundly rejected Virginia’s VWIL
alternative. She walked through the myriad differences between the programs:
military education versus “a ‘cooperative method’ of education ‘which reinforces self-esteem’ ”;592 the lack of a military-style residence and “barracks”
life designed to foster an “egalitarian ethic”;593 leadership training without the
physical rigor, mental stress, and minute regulation of behavior and a lack of
adversative training;594 a faculty with significantly fewer faculty members with
doctoral degrees;595 different educational courses;596 different physical training
facilities;597 and a different alumni network.598 In short, Ginsburg concluded,
Virginia “has created a VWIL program fairly appraised as a ‘pale shadow’ of
VMI in terms of the range of curricular choices and faculty stature, funding,
prestige, alumni support and influence.”599 Although VWIL may have had
some value for female students seeking such a program, Justice Ginsburg concluded that this alternative afforded “no cure at all for the opportunities and advantages withheld from women who want a VMI education and can make the
grade.”600
Justice Ginsburg was more willing and likely to give copyright plaintiffs
only partial relief than she was to endorse compromises in gender equality cases. Had she still been a law professor when legal scholarship began making
Virginia, 518 U.S. at 526.
Id. at 528.
590 United States v. Virginia, 852 F. Supp. 471, 484 (W.D. Va. 1994).
591 United States v. Virginia, 44 F.3d 1229, 1241 (4th Cir. 1995).
592 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 548.
593 Id.
594 Id. at 549.
595 Id. at 551.
596 Id. at 551–52 (describing the lack of engineering and advanced math and physics courses
at Mary Baldwin College).
597 Id. at 552 (“Mary Baldwin has ‘two multi-purpose fields’ and ‘[o]ne gymnasium.’ VMI
has ‘an NCAA competition level indoor track and field facility; a number of multi-purpose
fields; baseball, soccer and lacrosse fields; an obstacle course; large boxing, wrestling and
martial arts facilities; an 11–laps–to–the–mile indoor running course; an indoor pool; indoor
and outdoor rifle ranges; and a football stadium that also contains a practice field and outdoor track.’ ”).
598 Id.
599 Id. at 553.
600 Id. at 555.
588
589
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connections between human rights and copyright laws, one wonders what she
would have made of it as a fellow academic. It is regrettable that she will never
be able to adjudicate a case directly pitting civil rights against copyright protections, as no one could ever be as qualified as she was to do so.
V. STOICISM, THEN ANGER
A final theme running through Justice Ginsburg’s copyright jurisprudence,
her other writings, and her public life generally initially presented itself as “excessive politeness.” Yet after reflecting upon her frequently expressed institutional capacity doubts about the courts, it seems to be something rather more
complicated. What seemed like deferential politeness by Justice Ginsburg may
instead have reflected an innate stoicism. But eventually, this stoicism fractured
a little, permitting brief flashes of anger and frustration to emerge in a couple of
copyright cases, and other contexts as well.
A. Stoicism
Ruth Bader Ginsburg was obviously animated by making changes, especially social changes, though sometimes gradually and by degrees. Yet conterminously, she also was astonishingly stoic in the face of the devastating loss of
her husband Marty Ginsburg, and during the many health challenges she
pushed through while remaining on the job and fully engaged as a Supreme
Court Justice.601 Anyone who has seen video of Justice Ginsburg working out
with a trainer, wearing a grim but determined countenance, has witnessed her
stoicism manifest itself physically.602 Though in contemporary parlance the
word “stoic” is assumed to mean “emotionless,”603 Stoicism is a vibrant, action-oriented, and paradigm-shifting life philosophy.604
Epictetus, one of the most important ancient Stoic philosophers, explained
in The Discourses that the Stoic “must make the best use that we can of the
things which are in our power, and use the rest according to their nature.”605
But this should not be interpreted as complacency. Stoics believe in their ability

DE HART, supra note 262, at 410–11 (describing both Justice Ginsburg’s and Marty
Ginsburg’s cancer diagnoses, the subsequent surgery, and how she returned to Washington
to avoid missing oral arguments).
602 Veronica Stracqualursi, Ruth Bader Ginsburg Continues to Work Out at Supreme Court
Private Gym, Her Trainer Says, CNN, (Apr. 1, 2020, 5:09 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/
04/01/politics/ruth-bader-ginsburg-workout-coronavirus/index.html [https://perma.cc/R9D54KMX].
603 JOHN SELLARS, STOICISM 1 (Routledge 2014) (2006).
604 Id. at 2–3.
605 EPICTETUS, THE DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS 10 (Greenbook Publ’ns 2011) (c. 108 A.D.);
see also Jason Reddoch, The Stoics on Hope and Fear: How to Be a Politically Engaged
Stoic, 101 SOUNDINGS 52, 53 (2018).
601
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to change the world.606 Marcus Aurelius, Roman emperor from 161 to 180 A.D.
and one of the most famous Stoics, wrote, “The impediment to action advances
action. What stands in the way becomes the way.”607 What he meant was that
failure is an opportunity to be better, to do better, to reevaluate and start over.
Stoics believe that successful activism requires wisdom, strategy, and an abandonment of irrational emotions.608
Stoics highly value justice as a core principle. As Aurelius explained,
“[f]rom justice, all other virtues have their existence.”609 History is replete with
Stoics courageously advocating for justice to defend the principles they believed in.610 But there is also firm recognition that some things are out of our
control and must be left to nature. The late American novelist, playwright, essayist, poet, and activist James Baldwin captured this tension:
It began to seem that one would have to hold in mind forever two ideas
which seemed to be in opposition. The first idea was acceptance, the acceptance,
totally without rancor, of life as it is, and men as they are: in the light of this
idea, it goes without saying that injustices is a commonplace. But this did not
mean that one could be complacent, for the second idea was of equal power: that
one must never, in one’s own life, accept these injustices as commonplace but
must fight them with all one’s strength.611

To practicing Stoics, virtue must be its own reward; one does something
because it is the right thing to do.612 It does not matter whether one gets anything out of it personally; in fact, sometimes Stoicism requires taking action
that would lead to unpleasant personal outcomes.613 Stoics must do the right
thing; it is their nature.614 One can imagine Justice Ginsburg having had such a
phrase charmingly embroidered on a decorative pillow. More pointedly, whether or not she credited Marcus Aurelius for the proposition, she lived by these
thoroughly Ginsburgian words of his: “If it’s endurable, then endure it. Stop

Christopher Gill, Stoic Writers of the Imperial Era, in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF
GREEK AND ROMAN POLITICAL THOUGHT 597, 600 (Christopher Rowe & Malcolm Schofield
eds., 2000) (“The Stoic view is that political structures (like other social and interpersonal
structures) can, in principle, function as vehicles for the attempt to make progress towards
the life of virtue and sagehood.”); Malcolm Schofield, Epicurean and Stoic Political
Thought, in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF GREEK AND ROMAN POLITICAL THOUGHT, supra, at
435, 435–36, 443–46, 451–53.
607 RYAN HOLIDAY, THE OBSTACLE IS THE WAY, at xiv (2014).
608 Reddoch, supra note 605, at 64.
609 MARCUS AURELIUS, MEDITATIONS 109 (Méric Casaubon trans., Enhanced Media 2017)
(c. 171–175 A.D.).
610 See, e.g., Gill, supra note 606, at 601 (describing the activism of Musonius Rufus and his
subsequent exile).
611 JAMES BALDWIN, NOTES OF A NATIVE SON 114–15 (rev. ed. 2012).
612 SELLARS, supra note 603, at 3 (“[V]irtue alone is sufficient for happiness.”).
613 Id. at 108–09.
614 Id. at 109.
606
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complaining.”615 Activists like Justice Ginsburg have used these Stoic precepts
as a framework for fighting for important ideals.
Justice Ginsburg’s stoicism is evident within her copyright jurisprudence
as a willingness to go against the traditional liberal values she was otherwise
associated with. Copyright protection can fairly be described as a socially permissible form of censorship.616 When someone copyrights a text, no one is supposed to say or repeat those words617 without the authority of the copyright
holder. If one asks the copyright holder for permission to speak their copyrightprotected words, the copyright holder can attempt to charge a licensing fee for
the privilege of using their text or can deny permission altogether. For these
reasons, copyright laws can function as tools of censorship,618 something a
good liberal consistently abhors. But Justice Ginsburg favored strong copyright
protections.619 This brought criticism her way, which she stoically ignored.
When Justice Ginsburg persuaded a Supreme Court majority that the freelance writers were entitled to copyright royalties in Tasini, she shook off dire
predictions that the world would lose access to all of the articles, history, and
“knowledge” that the freelancers had written.620 When she declined to give an
injunction to the freelance writers to leverage against the publishers, she was
arguably betraying labor in favor of capital. In a 2003 law review article,
Maureen O’Rourke asked an important policy question: “If the Copyright Act
provides authors with a right that the market often renders valueless, has its
goal[] [of incentivizing new works] necessarily been thwarted?”621 She explained why the holding in Tasini was not actually going to benefit the prevailing freelancers very much, observing that “[a]lthough the holding in the case
ostensibly gave freelancers a bargaining chip, a lack of bargaining power precludes their obtaining additional consideration for licensing their judicially vin-

MARCUS AURELIUS, MEDITATIONS 132 (Gregory Hays trans., Mod. Libr. 2003) (c. 171–
175 A.D.). In fact, Justice Ginsburg was offered similar advice from Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor early in her tenure on the Court. After receiving her first opinion assignment,
which involved an intricate and difficult case, Justice Ginsburg sought Justice O’Connor’s
advice. Justice O’Connor told her, “Just do it and, if you can, circulate a draft before [Chief
Justice Rehnquist] makes the next set of assignments. Otherwise, you will risk receiving another tedious case.” DE HART, supra note 262, at 327. Justice Ginsburg was very appreciative of this advice, and it helped cement a close friendship between the two. Id.
616 John Tehranian, The New ©ensorship, 101 IOWA L. REV. 245, 247–50 (2015); Mark A.
Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 182 (1998).
617 This is an oversimplification for literary purposes. Fair use and other copyright law doctrines always allow limited unauthorized uses of copyright protected works.
618 Tehranian, supra note 616, at 250 (“As this Article argues, copyright law has become the
weapon par excellence of the 21st-century censor.”).
619 See supra Sections I.A and I.B.
620 N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 504–05 (2001).
621 Maureen A. O’Rourke, Bargaining in the Shadow of Copyright Law After Tasini, 53
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 605, 616 (2003).
615
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dicated rights.”622 By declining to grant an injunction to the freelancers, Justice
Ginsburg deprived labor of the full fruits of its labor and saved the publishers
plenty of capital.
In Eldred v. Ashcroft, she was widely accused of betraying the First
Amendment when she wrote for a majority holding the Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA), a law extending almost all U.S. copyrights by two decades,
was constitutional.623 The CTEA also extended existing copyrights, thereby
preventing twenty years’ worth of existing works from falling out of copyright
protection.624 This meant that almost nothing new was contributed to the public
domain, where it could be freely used, during that extended interval. Critics of
the holding sarcastically pointed out that the CTEA’s retroactive copyright extensions would not be effective at incentivizing dead authors to create new
works.625 Justice Ginsburg did not flinch.
Finally, when she dissented in Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, she ignored impassioned claims that the copyright protections in dispute would restrict access to the law, especially to people with low incomes. Instead, she prioritized the commodification of Georgia’s laws over making sure that Georgia
citizens had the best opportunity to access and understand the statutes that bind
them.626 She even got Justice Breyer, who was typically her loyal opposition in
copyright law cases, to join her in dissent.627 One commentator astutely noted
after her passing that her stoicism was one of “5 Great Things We Should Never Forget About Ruth Bader Ginsburg.”628
B. From Stoicism to Exasperation
In On Anger, Stoic philosopher Seneca asked: “What bad habit have you
put right today? Which fault did you take a stand against? In what respect are
Id. at 606.
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 194 (2003).
624 Id. at 195.
625 See William Patry, The United States and International Copyright Law: From Berne to
Eldred, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 749, 761 (2003); Matthew Sag et al., Ideology and Exceptionalism
in Intellectual Property: An Empirical Study, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 801, 815 (2009).
626 Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1498, 1522–24 (2020).
627 Id.
628 Alisa Ross, 5 Great Things We Should Never Forget About Ruth Bader Ginsburg (19332020), GOOD NEWS NETWORK (Sept. 21, 2020), https://www.goodnewsnetwork.org/5-greatreasons-to-remember-ruth-bader-ginsburg/ [https://perma.cc/52ND-2HL2] (“She showed
there’s value in stoicism. In an interview with legal academic Jeffrey Rosen, published in the
Atlantic, she spoke of ignoring ‘useless emotions.’ ‘My mother’s advice was, don’t lose time
on useless emotions like anger, resentment, remorse, envy. Those, she said, will just sap
time; they don’t get you where you want to be.’ ‘One way I coped with times I was angry: I
would sit down and practice the piano. I wasn’t very good at it, but it did distract me from
whatever useless emotion I was feeling at the moment. Later, I did the same with the cello. I
would be absorbed in the music, and the useless emotion faded away.’ Perhaps that’s why
RBC [sic] loved listening to classical music all her life—even during her famous
workouts.”).
622
623
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you better?”629 Throughout her career and life, Justice Ginsburg exhibited a
high degree of professional restraint, but her stoicism seemed to lessen, almost
as if it got worn down. At her Supreme Court confirmation hearings in 1993,
Justice Ginsburg said, “[W]hat a judge should take account of is not the weather of the day, but the climate of an era.”630 During her years on the Court, Justice Ginsburg experienced significant climate change.631 When she joined the
Court, Bill Clinton was President of the United States, and the majority of her
colleagues were moderates or liberals. This changed. She was always part of an
outnumbered liberal wing on the Court throughout her twenty-seven-year tenure, she but experienced the entire Court grow more conservative over time.632
As her years on the Supreme Court passed, Justice Ginsburg gradually began
expressing frustration and discontent publicly.
In Bush v. Gore in 2000, Justice Ginsburg did not “respectfully” dissent
from the majority’s decision to shut down the Florida recount in contravention
of a ruling by Florida’s Supreme Court; she simply (and emphatically) dissented.633 She later said the case exemplified “how important—and difficult—it is
for judges to do what is legally right, no matter what ‘the home crowd’
wants.”634 She seemed furious at her colleagues who voted in the majority, and
in this, she represented a majority of voters who had given the popular vote to
Al Gore. But even in anger, she remained polite.
It must have been deeply frustrating for Justice Ginsburg that usually she
could only make an impact on social justice issues through her feisty dissents.
In 2007, a Supreme Court majority denied relief to Lilly Ledbetter in Ledbetter
v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., holding that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 imposed strict time limits for bringing workplace discrimination
suits.635 Justice Ginsburg called on Congress to overturn the decision legislatively,636 and it did.637 Justice Ginsburg reportedly kept a framed copy of the
Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009 on the wall of her chambers, counting the

SENECA, ON ANGER bk. III (c. 45 A.D.), reprinted in SENECA: DIALOGUES AND ESSAYS
18, 47 (John Davie & Tobias Reinhardt eds., John Davie trans., Oxford Univ. Press 2007)
(recounting the custom of Sextius).
630 Confirmation Hearing, supra note 260, at 303.
631 DE HART, supra note 262, at 408–10 (describing Justice Ginsburg’s growing frustration
with the direction of the Court).
632 Adam Liptak, Justice Ginsburg’s Judicial Legacy of Striking Dissents, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
18, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/18/us/rbg-accomplishments.html [perma.cc/
EXV6-QT77].
633 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 135–44 (2000) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
634 Charles Lane, Ginsburg Critical on Bush v. Gore, WASH. POST (Feb. 3, 2001),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2001/02/03/ginsburg-critical-on-bush-vgore/a4fb7268-3c49-4e8a-b92b-dd2f6cb53325/ [https://perma.cc/78NP-VP68].
635 Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 621 (2007).
636 Id. at 643–61 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (calling for Congress to change the law).
637 Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (overruling the Supreme Court’s decision in Ledbetter).
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law “among her proudest achievements, even as it illustrated her limited power.”638
In remarks delivered at the National Museum of Women and the Arts in
Washington, D.C., on April 15, 2015, Justice Ginsburg, reflecting on advice
given to her by Justice O’Connor, said, “Waste no time in anger, regret, or resentment, just get the job done.”639 A year later, however, she was described as
“the court’s most outspoken justice off the bench” when she made deeply critical remarks to the press about then-Presidential candidate Donald Trump.640
Justice Ginsburg observed again in a 2017 lecture that “[a]nger is a useless
emotion. It doesn’t advance your cause.”641 Yet recently, from her granddaughter Clara Spera, we have learned that she carried a lot of anger inside, and that
it built up over time.642 This is an excerpt from an October 2020 interview with
Spera:
[INTERVIEWER:] There was a paradox with your grandmother’s body of
work, in which she would talk a lot about civility and institutions. She would often cite advice from her mother that anger is a distraction or a waste of time.
[“My mother’s advice was don’t lose time on useless emotions like anger, resentment, remorse, envy,” Ginsburg said. “Those, she said, will just sap time;
they don’t get you where you want to be.”]
[CLARA SPERA:] Right.
[INTERVIEWER:] But in reality, she often was angry. Especially near the end
of her life, she was dissenting. Of course, she was using the tools of the Court,
but it was not very civil the way she called out Trump, even though she apologized. I’ve talked about this a lot with Rebecca Traister, my colleague and
friend, because she wrote a whole book about women and anger and change. She
told me that at practically every talk she gives, somebody asks about Justice
Ginsburg repeating the advice from her mother.
[CLARA SPERA:] In the ’70s, being a woman and angry wouldn’t get you
very far. It’s also important to remember the context in which she was working.
She was in the courts. There were other venues, perhaps, where to be more emotive would be a successful strategy, but I don’t think that doing that in front of
an all-male three-judge panel, or nine male justices of the Supreme Court, would
have helped her and her argument and her cause.

Liptak, supra note 632.
GINSBURG ET AL., supra note 258, at 90.
640 See Pete Williams et al., Ruth Bader Ginsburg Doubles Down on Donald Trump Criticism, NBC NEWS (July 13, 2016, 07:32 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2016election/ruth-bader-ginsburg-doubles-down-trump-criticism-n608006
[https://perma.cc/NLW8-E8M9].
641 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stanford Rathbun Lecture (Feb. 6, 2017) (transcript available at
IOWA
STATE
UNIV.:
ARCHIVE
OF
WOMEN’S
POL.
COMMC’N,
https://awpc.cattcenter.iastate.edu/2017/10/05/stanford-rathbun-lecture-february-6-2017
[https://perma.cc/S9UD-UT97]).
642 Irin Carmon, Honoring Her Wish: In Conversation with Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s Granddaughter, ACLU Fellow Clara Spera, N.Y. MAG. (Oct. 23, 2020),
https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2020/10/clara-spera-ruth-bader-ginsburg-aclu.html
[https://perma.cc/5YYN-SFC3].
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Again, this returns to the benefits that my generation has reaped from the work
that she did, in that now I don’t think it is as unsettling or as strange for a woman to express anger. And I want to be clear that I mean a white woman. Because
I think you still see this dichotomy, the stereotype of the quote “Angry Black
woman.” So I think women of color do not get to be angry in the same way that
white women or white-passing women get to get angry. And I think, if we go
back to the ’70s, no women could be angry in the way that men could be angry.
So we’ve moved forward with our ability to express anger, but this does not apply equally to all women and to all people.643

Had she started her career in the 2000s, maybe Ruth Bader Ginsburg would
have repressed her anger less. In 2013, she read five dissents from the bench,
breaking a fifty-year record among the Justices, perhaps reflecting impatience
with her colleagues as well as disagreement.644 Yet she kept her much-vaunted
composure, at least in public.645 Colorado Attorney General Philip Weiser, one
of her former Supreme Court clerks, recently observed, “There’s a quote of
hers that I think about a lot. It’s something like, ‘Never react in anger.’ She
kept her cool and she kept her relationships. She always maintained her equanimity, her calm, even in the midst of a storm.”646 Weiser clerked for Ruth Bader Ginsburg in 1995–96, when perhaps she was more successfully bottling up
any feelings of anger. By 2020, she was more willing to publicly express negative emotions. The Trump years were very hard on her. Just a few months before her death, she was being called “the face of the Trump resistance.”647
How might her anger have affected her copyright jurisprudence? So many
alarming things happened during the Trump presidency that adjudicating copyright cases might have actually felt like a respite to her. While her stoicism may
have been visible in her copyright jurisprudence, the relatively scant evidence
of anger in her copyright jurisprudence is primarily in tone rather than substance. And it reads more like exasperation than anger.
In Part III, we explained how Justice Ginsburg often expressed doubts
about the institutional capacity of the courts with respect to copyright law and
policy.648 All those years of frustration and helplessness when she was unable
to attract a majority that would help her advance social justice on issues that
were deeply important to her may have taken a toll. Though none of her writId.
IRIN CARMON & SHANA KNIZHNIK, NOTORIOUS RBG: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF RUTH
BADER GINSBURG 5 (2015).
645 Diane Carman, Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s Legacy Lives in the Beating Hearts of Colorado’s
Justice
System,
COLO.
SUN
(Sept.
21,
2020,
3:10
AM),
https://coloradosun.com/2020/09/21/ruth-bader-ginsburg-phil-weiser-supreme-courtopinion/ [https://perma.cc/SN8F-ZTD6].
646 Id.
647 See Chris Cillizza, How RBG Became the Face of the Trump Resistance, CNN: THE
PO!NT (April 2, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/videos/politics/2020/04/02/ruth-bader-ginsb
urg-trump-resistance-cillizza-the-point.cnn/video/playlists/ruth-bader-ginsburg-rbg/
[https://perma.cc/NP6D-G36Q].
648 See supra Section III.B.
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ings in copyright cases descend in tone to a point of churlishness, a decided
impatience with her colleagues is evident in her 2013 dissent in Kirtsaeng I, as
demonstrated by this excerpt:
Instead of adhering to the Legislature’s design, the Court today adopts an interpretation of the Copyright Act at odds with Congress’ aim to protect copyright
owners against the unauthorized importation of low-priced, foreign-made copies
of their copyrighted works. The Court’s bold departure from Congress’ design is
all the more stunning, for it places the United States at the vanguard of the
movement for “international exhaustion” of copyrights—a movement the United
States has steadfastly resisted on the world stage.
To justify a holding that shrinks to insignificance copyright protection
against the unauthorized importation of foreign-made copies, the Court identifies several “practical problems.” The Court’s parade of horribles, however, is
largely imaginary. Congress’ objective in enacting 17 U.S.C. § 602(a)(1)’s importation prohibition can be honored without generating the absurd consequences hypothesized in the Court’s opinion. I dissent from the Court’s embrace of
“international exhaustion,” and would affirm the sound judgment of the Court of
Appeals.649

Throughout her years as a Supreme Court Justice, she always stood a much
better chance of writing or joining a majority opinion in a copyright law case
than she did in cases involving issues like voting rights, civil rights, or reproductive freedom. Perhaps that made lost opportunities to build a majority and
craft a majority opinion in a copyright law case such as Kirtsaeng deeply disappointing.
CONCLUSION
Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s copyright decisions favored copyright owners and
authors.650 But careful review of her writings reveals a rich and complex copyright jurisprudence. Her opinions reflect her consistent position that optimal legal changes occur in incremental steps651 and in collaboration with the other
branches of government.652 Ginsburg’s groundbreaking litigation on gender
equality653 and her dogged pursuit of civil rights as a jurist understandably outshine her copyright jurisprudence, but her copyright jurisprudence is also quite
fascinating, at least to copyright law geeks and aficionados like us.

649
650
651
652
653

Kirtsaeng I, 568 U.S. 519, 557 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
See supra Sections I.A. and I.B.
See supra Part II.
See supra Section III.A.
See supra notes 1 and 5 and accompanying text.

